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In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court deferred to an agency's controversial interpretation of a key
provision of a regulatory statute. Lower courts now apply "Chevron deference"
as a matter of course, upholding agencies' reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous provisions within the statutes they administer. Recently, however,
the Court refused in King v. Burwell to defer to an agency's answer to a statutory
question, citing the "deep economic and political significance" of the question
itself. The Court in King offered barebones guidance regarding the scope of and
rationales for embracing this so-called "major questions exception" to Chevron
deference, and the decision has thus created uncertainty regarding Chevron's
application in the courts below. Surveying the post-King landscape, we advance
in this Article a simple and straightforward proposal designed to ameliorate
the confusion that King has wrought. Our proposal is that only the Supreme
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Court should apply the major questions exception: absent further instruction
from the Court, neither the federal district courts nor the U.S. courts of appeals
should withhold Chevron deference on grounds of majorness alone. Our
argument stems from a comparative institutional analysis of the Court and its
subordinates, coupled with an unpacking of the various policies and purposes
that the major questions exception might serve. These investigations yield the
surprising conclusion that only the Court has the institutional capacity to
realize the exception's benefits, whereas all the federal courts would realize its
costs. That being so, we believe the most sensible means of implementing the
major questions exception would be to treat it as the exclusive province of the
Supreme Court.
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MINOR COURTS, MAJOR QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Some questions of statutory interpretation are too important for
federal agencies to answer. At least, that seems to be the lesson of King
v. Burwell, in which the Supreme Court held that the Chevron doctrine
did not apply to a statutory "question of deep 'economic and political
significance'" that was "central" to one of the most controversial pieces
of legislation in recent memory, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("ACA"). 1 That question, the Court held, instead warranted a
form of de novo review that was uninfluenced by the agency's
interpretive position.2 King has thus been said to support a so-called
"major questions exception" ("MQE") to the Chevron rule,3 which
withholds from agencies the power to resolve statutory ambiguities
where the political andlor economic stakes are especially high.
The Court has not revisited the MQE in the two or so years since
King was decided. But the exception has not lain dormant in the courts
below. Litigants have brought the MQE to the attention of both district
and circuit court judges, and these judges have already rendered
opinions that rely on King's formulation of the MQE. 4 Many lower court
opinions, to be sure, continue to apply Chevron without any discussion
of the "majorness" (and hence Chevron-eligibility) of the statutory
questions under consideration. But the post-King lower court cases
reveal that judges and litigants in the courts below regard the MQE as
an operative and revitalized component of the law that they apply.
That outlook, however, is misguided, and this Article attempts
to explain why. King notwithstanding, the lower courts should not apply
the MQE. Rather, the exception should exist as a tool for the Supreme
Court and only the Supreme Court to use, and lower courts should
therefore never ask whether a given question qualifies as "minor"
enough for Chevron or "major" enough for some other standard of
review. Our thesis, in other words, is that a question should not qualify
1. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). At issue was the meaning of Section 36B of the Internal Revenue
Code, as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
2. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
3. Chevron's famous two-step test goes like this: First, a court must apply the ordinary tools
of statutory construction to decide "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Where
Congress has been clear, the court must give effect to its unambiguous intent. Id. at 842-43. If,
however, the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," Chevron's second
step requires the court to ask "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction ..... Id.
4. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
2017] 779
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
as "major" unless and until the Court has granted certiorari to resolve
it.
In advancing this claim, we take no position on the overall
desirability of the MQE as a Chevron-limiting tool.5 Regardless of how
one feels about what the Court did in King, one should prefer a regime
in which only the Court applies the MQE to a regime in which all federal
courts do the same. The MQE's opponents should favor our proposal as
a principled, "second-best" alternative to a world without King, and the
MQE's proponents should favor our proposal as the most cost-effective
means of implementing the MQE's animating goals. Our proposed
regime of "Supreme Court exclusivity," it seems to us, is one that both
sides of this debate should endorse.6
More specifically, we believe that our proposed rule would
achieve the benefits of the MQE while avoiding unnecessary costs. If
the lower courts are to apply the MQE, then the Court must define what
makes a question "major." But the King Court did not define "major
questions," and we think that's because there's no easy way to articulate
the contours of any such requirement. More likely, the Court knows a
major question when it sees it, applying an all-things-considered
judgment based upon, as in King, a felt sense of the legal and political
times. Our proposed rule thus significantly reduces the decision costs of
defining and applying the MQE, and it eliminates the potential for
lower courts to err while invoking the exception and refusing to defer to
agencies under Chevron.
At the same time, our rule would leave undisturbed the potential
benefits that the MQE might confer. The Court has provided little
guidance about the values that justify the MQE. One of our aims,
therefore, is to take stock of the potential rationales for the MQE and
5. King and its predecessor cases have their fair share of detractors, and we are not
unsympathetic to the criticisms that these detractors have raised. See, e.g., Jacob Loshin & Aaron
Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). At the same time, we also develop potential
justifications for the MQE that encompass King as well as major questions cases that other
commentators have discussed. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 761 (2007); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the "Major Questions" Exception to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong),
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008).
6. While we need not ake a position on King's MQE as an exception to Chevron, our thesis
reflects two assumptions about Chevron. First, we believe that Chevron is not inconsistent with
the judicial duty to say what the law is. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983). Second, as discussed infra notes 155-156 and accompanying
text, we think that one of Chevron's virtues is that it reduces the costs of deciding agency cases for
lower courts, and our proposal seeks to maintain this cost-economizing function by directing lower
courts not to wrestle with "majorness" when deciding whether to apply Chevron, See Thomas W.
Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 753 (2014) ("Chevron's appeal
for the courts rests in significant part on its ease of application as a decisional device.").
780 [Vol. 70:3:777
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to ask whether any of those rationales would require active lower court
involvement in the MQE's implementation. Surprisingly, our answer to
this question is "no"; all of the goals that we attribute to the MQE are
goals that only the Supreme Court is well situated to achieve. Thus,
even if one accepts the MQE as a worthwhile doctrinal project, one
stands to gain little from calling upon lower court judges to join the
Justices in the project's pursuit.
Our analysis contributes to administrative law practice and
scholarship in four distinct ways. First, we attempt to bring both
descriptive and prescriptive clarity to the doctrinal world that King has
created. Descriptively, we aim to show that the Court in King broke
significant new ground, according to majorness a much more
consequential role than did any of King's predecessor cases. King did
not so much embellish upon the Court's previous "major question"
decisions,7 as it introduced a brand new formulation into the mix. King's
expansive recharacterization of the MQE raises important questions
about how lower courts should apply the exception going forward. And
to that set of questions, our prescriptive contribution offers a simple yet
satisfactory solution: lower courts should assume that all statutory
questions qualify as "minor," leaving it to the Court and the Court alone
to identify the "extraordinary" set of cases in which that presumption
should not apply.
The second contribution of our Article is conceptual. The positive
case for Supreme Court exclusivity depends on an accounting of the
goals and objectives of the MQE itself. King proves cryptic on this point.
Aside from a terse (and dubious) argument about congressional intent,
the Court provided no justification for its decision to ignore the agency's
reading of the "economic [ally] and political[ly] significan[t]" 8 statute at
issue. We thus attempt o fill this theoretical void by considering other
potential rationales for the MQE: perhaps, for instance, the MQE
indirectly polices the limits of the nondelegation doctrine;9 perhaps it
7. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
8. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
9. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223 (exploring whether the nondelegation values might be enforced through the major
questions canon as a means of constitutional avoidance). The nondelegation doctrine holds that
Congress may not delegate "powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). It has been sparingly enforced and is the subject of an
extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1994) (arguing "that the core of the Constitution's
nondelegation principle can be expressed as follows: Congress must make whatever policy
decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make
them"); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
2017] 781
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fosters democratic accountability by channeling resolution of the
question to a highly visible and widely monitored public institution;10
or perhaps it facilitates the long-term settlement of contentious political
debates that would otherwise continue unabated." The jury is still out,
of course, as to whether these rationales (either in isolation or in
combination) provide a sufficient justification for the exception's
existence, and our Article does not purport to offer any definitive
resolutions one way or the other. But in developing a deeper
examination of the MQE's theoretical premises, we hope to enrich the
discussion as to whether-and, if so, when-those premises make
sense.
The Article's third contribution is methodological. We are well
aware of our proposal's seemingly unusual (and some might say
provocative) nature: in advocating that lower courts never apply an
exception that the Court sometimes applies, we are calling for the
deployment of different review standards at different levels of a unitary
federal court system. That's not typically how things work; instead,
when the Court applies a rule, lower federal courts can, do, and should
apply that same rule in an undifferentiated fashion. Our proposal runs
contrary to that tradition, but we do not view this as a bad thing.
When it comes to separation of powers questions, the judicial
branch is not-or at least should not be understood as-a single,
undifferentiated "black box." Rather, it consists of different and
distinctive institutions with different and distinctive institutional
features. It is for this reason that we accept Professor Aaron-Andrew
Bruhl's recent invitation to consider "hierarchically variable deference
to agency interpretations," with degrees of deference varying depending
REV. 1721, 1723 (2002) (contending that there is "no constitutional warrant" for nondelegation
limits).
10. An extensive literature evaluates administrative law by considering whether it fosters
political accountability. See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 186-87 (2014) (considering literature and arguing that too much
accountability can be undesirable); see also Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political
Accountability, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1136-37 (2014) (discussing literature). In Part II.A.3,
we shift to focus on salience rather than the more abstract conception of accountability, asking
whether the MQE might make controversial legal questions more salient to voters and legislators.
One of our contributions is thus to encourage greater precision in our evaluation of administrative
law in terms of "accountability." Cf. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073-74 (2005) (noting that "accountability ... is
used in a variety of different ways").
11. By shifting major questions from the executive branch, which changes hands at least
every eight years, to the Court, the MQE might facilitate settlement of regulatory questions that
are particularly likely to be politically controversial. This settlement might be seen as either
intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to
Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1054 (2013) (discussing settlement as a "core function of law and
courts").
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on a reviewing court's place within the Article III hierarchy.12 Indeed,
we think that whether one is thinking specifically about our proposal
involving the MQE, more generally about he problem of judicial review
of agency action, or even more generally still about the role of the
judicial branch in a system of separated powers, one should take
seriously the possibility of assigning to different types of federal courts
differentiated approaches to reviewing government action.13 Our
analysis here, we hope, will help to highlight the merits of this idea.
The Article's fourth and final contribution is normative. The
internal logic of our proposal, we believe, follows naturally from the
presumptions underlying both the Chevron rule and the immediately
apparent rationales for exempting "major" questions from the ambit of
that rule. But, as we argue in the Article's concluding Part, the rise of
polarization, hyperpartisanship, and authoritarianism within the
political sphere requires further thinking about these presumptions
and rationales themselves. That seems especially so, we think, in light
of the 2016 presidential election, in which Donald Trump campaigned
on a threat to "jail" his Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton,14 a ban on
the immigration of Muslims to the United States,15 and a promise
immediately to deport two to three million undocumented immigrants,
among other things, and in which fellow members of the Republican
party signaled little willingness to resist the President's alarming
agenda. We do not yet know how the Trump administration will utilize
12. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (2013) [hereinafter Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference]; see also
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To Read a Statute in a Lower Court,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 482-84 (2012). Drawing upon Peter Strauss's insights into the
disciplining effect of Chevron on lower courts, Richard Pierce has suggested the possibility of
"[r]educ[ing] or eliminat[ing] deference in Supreme Court decisionmaking ... [while] retain[ing]"
Chevron for the circuit courts. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1313-14 (2016) (citing Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-35 (1987)). For further discussion, see infra note 157.
13. For the related suggestion that various areas of public law doctrine already pursue this
strategy of "vertical disaggregation" in an indirect fashion, see Michael Coenen, Spillover Across
Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1287-89 (2014).
14. Bridgette Dunlap, Trump's Open Disdain for the Rule of Law, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 11,
2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/trumps-open-disdain-for-the-rule-of-law-
w444093 [https://perma.cc/X6N8-78XW] (discussing Donald Trump's statement at a presidential
debate that Clinton would "be in jail" under a Trump presidency).
15. Adam Liptak, Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-
power.html [https://perma.cc/FNK8-ZWFU] (noting Donald Trump's promise to ban Muslim
immigration to the United States).
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agencies in the service of its goals,16 but it is by no means difficult to
imagine agencies in the Trump administration eschewing interpretive
judgment and policy-based expertise altogether in favor of the raw and
opportunistic exercise of power, with little regard for norms and
conventions that have traditionally cabined its use. We thus conclude
the Article by considering ways in which the Chevron test might be
modified to account for the prospect of severe dysfunction within the
scheme of separated powers. In particular, we imagine a variation on
the MQE that might permit the case-specific withholding of deference
on dysfunction-related grounds, and we consider the particular role that
lower courts might play in applying such a "major dysfunctions"
exception to the Chevron rule.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the legal backdrop
and advances our descriptive claim that the Court in King recast the
major questions exception in a major doctrinal way. Part II then
defends our prescriptive thesis that the MQE-as set forth in King-
should apply only in cases that the Supreme Court has decided to
hear. 17 We advance this claim in two Subsections. First, we argue that
the MQE's underlying values are ones that lower courts are not well
positioned to vindicate. Second, we contend that lower court application
of the MQE would impose unnecessary costs on a variety of different
institutional actors, including but not limited to the lower courts
themselves. Therefore, we ultimately conclude that lower court
application of the MQE is pointless at best and harmful at worst, while
an alternative "hands-off' approach to the MQE would be useful at best
and harmless at worst.18 Part III considers and responds to several
potential objections to our proposal, including, among other things, the
concern that it adversely affects the "percolation" of questions in the
lower courts, the concern that it disrupts reliance interests, and the
concern that it too cavalierly invites lower court defiance of the
Supreme Court's commands. The key point is simply this: whatever
duty the Court wants to assume to decide "major" regulatory questions
for itself, the lower courts would do no harm (and perhaps even some
good) by leaving the MQE to the Court alone.
Part IV then uses the MQE (and the case law underlying it) as a
launching pad for considering broader questions about the future of
16. Substantive edits to this Article were completed as of December 2016, meaning that the
foregoing analysis does not take account of any events occurring during the early months of the
Trump presidency.
17. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
18. For a discussion of these arguments as applied to the D.C. Circuit, which plays a unique
role in administrative law, see infra note 114.
784 [Vol. 70:3:777
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Chevron in an age of political dysfunction.19 In applying the MQE, the
Court has occasionally adverted to concerns about procedural
irregularity, hyperpartisanship, and executive overreach as bolstering
its hesitance to apply Chevron in its pure, unvarnished form, and it is
thus worth considering how those concerns might be more explicitly
translated into a dysfunction-based exception to Chevron itself.20 It is
also worth asking whether such an exception might accommodate
increased lower court involvement in realizing its animating goals. In
other words, if the relevant exception were triggered not by the
substantive "majorness" of a statutory question but instead by
indicators of dysfunctional partisan politics, would a program of
Supreme Court exclusivity continue to make sense? In our view,
acknowledging the heterogeneity of the federal judiciary will facilitate
careful thinking about this particular question and, more broadly, the
future of administrative law.
I. THE "MAJOR QUESTIONS" EXCEPTION
This Part argues that King v. Burwell changed the law by
establishing an exception to Chevron that treats a court's independent
judgment about the significance of a statutory question as a threshold
reason not to apply Chevron.21 The Supreme Court's pre-King cases
19. Our aim is to think about the "place of agencies" and courts in a time of partisanship, a
concern of a recent and growing body of scholarship. See generally Cynthia R. Farina & Gillian E.
Metzger, Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1683
(2015). And our central contribution to this conversation is to open up the black box of the judiciary
to argue that concerns about partisanship and divided government might lead us to treat the Court
and the lower courts differently. Whether more aggressive judicial review is a solution to the ills
of partisanship in the political branches is, of course, debatable. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect
Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress's Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking,
129 HARv. L. REV. 62, 63-64 (2015); Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport:
Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1758 (2012); Gillian E. Metzger,
Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1777-79 (2015). But we hope at
least to contribute to this debate by drawing attention to the possibility of designing solutions in
a way that acknowledges and responds to relevant institutional distinctions within the federal
judicial branch.
20. This dysfunctions-based account owes--dare we say it-a major debt to Bressman, supra
note 5, at 765, who argued that the Court's decisions in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), might be explained by a
requirement that agencies exercise their lawmaking authority "in a democratically reasonable
fashion."
21. Other commentators have noted King's departure from the previous major questions
cases. See Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1869
(2015) ("Strikingly, the magnitude of the issue did not simply keep the Court in 'step one' of
Chevron, it induced the Court to jettison Chevron altogether."); Stefanie Hoffer & Christopher J.
Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 40 (suggesting that King's
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treated the political and economic significance of an agency's stated
position as one among many factors to consider when applying Chevron,
at most hinting that concerns about "majorness" might remove a case
from the Chevron framework altogether. In King, by contrast, the Court
considered the "majorness" of the question without reference to the
particular answer the agency had given, and concluded in a terse
paragraph that the question itself was too important for the agency to
answer. Thus (re)formulated, the MQE casts significant uncertainty
over Chevron's future in the courts below.
To develop these points, this Part begins by sketching the
Chevron framework. It then describes the major questions doctrine
prior to King, focusing upon the Court's previous invocations of the
majorness factor at Steps One or Two of the Chevron analysis. The
analysis then describes King's alternative, "Step Zero"-based
formulation of the MQE, highlighting the important differences
between King and its predecessor cases.
A. The Chevron Framework
Unlike the MQE, the Chevron framework is simple to describe. 22
At Step One, a court applies the ordinary tools of statutory construction
to decide "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue."2 3 Where Congress has been clear, the court "must give effect
to [its] unambiguously expressed intent."24 If the statute is ambiguous,
the court moves to Step Two and must defer to an agency position that
"is based on a permissible construction of the statute."25
Chevron emphasized two rationales for assigning primary
interpretive authority to agencies rather than to courts in cases of
statutory ambiguity. First, federal courts lack an agency's expertise in
policymaking.26 Second, agencies, though "not directly accountable to
the people," are more politically accountable than the federal courts.27
Eventually, courts and commentators came to treat expertise and
reformulation of the MQE "broke new ground in administrative law"); Kevin 0. Leske, Major
Questions About the "Major Questions" Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 480 (2016)
("[The Court in King v. Burwell ... declined to apply the Chevron framework altogether."); Note,
Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2191 (2016) (noting that King "has sparked a
fresh round of critical examination" of the major questions doctrine).
22. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. Id. at 842.
24. Id. at 843.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 865.
27. Id. at 865-66.
786 [Vol. 70:3:777
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accountability as reasons to assume that Congress intends courts to
defer to agencies' statutory interpretations in some cases.28
This intentionalist account of Chevron emerged in United States
v. Mead Corp., which clarified the scope of Chevron's application.29
Mead's "Step Zero"30 inquiry requires a court to ask if the agency has
been delegated authority to act with the "force of law" and if the agency
has in fact so acted when rendering the interpretation being
considered.31 Chevron, Mead held, should apply when both conditions
have been met. Otherwise, a court may give an agency's views
"Skidmore weight" based upon their power to persuade.32 Mead thus
treats the question of Chevron's applicability as one of congressional
intent. The working assumption is that Congress intends for agencies
to have primary interpretive authority when it delegates to those
agencies the power to adopt policies with the force of law.
B. Majorness Within Chevron: The "Elephants-in-Mouseholes" Canon
and Recalibrated Reasonableness Review
Though it had precursors,33 the majorness inquiry first
crystallized in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,34 with the
Court endorsing what's come to be known as the "elephant-in-
mouseholes"35 canon of statutory construction. This canon directs
courts to presume at Chevron Step One that Congress does not delegate
28. See Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 276-77 (2011).
29. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
30. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836-37
(2001); see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 187.
31. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
32. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). We adopt Peter Strauss's phrase
"Skidmore weight" while continuing to use the more familiar phrase "Chevron deference" to refer
to the Chevron framework, though the term "deference" is not without its difficulties. See Peter L.
Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight,"
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012).
33. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363 (1986). Professor Cass Sunstein, for instance, traces the major question doctrine's origins to
the Court's decision in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), in which the
Justices invalidated an FCC regulation exempting most telecommunications carriers from the
tariff-filing requirements of the 1934 Communications Act. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 237.
Specifically, in rejecting the FCC's position at Step One, the Court emphasized "the normous
importance to the statutory scheme of the tariff-filing provision" and found it "highly unlikely that
Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even
substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion." MCI, 512 U.S. at 231. And the Court would cite
to its decision in MCI when invoking the "elephants in mouseholes" idea in subsequent cases. See
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000); see also Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S 457, 468 (2001).
34. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
35. See Loshin & Nielson, supra note 5, at 19.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
powers of major "economic and political significance" to agencies in
"cryptic" statutory text.36 Congress does not, in other words, hide the
delegation of elephant-like regulatory powers in the mousehole-like
landscape of obscure and technical statutory provisions.
In 1996, the Food and Drug Administration issued a landmark
rule regulating tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA").37 The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction was an about-face
from its previous position on tobacco, and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit struck it down under Chevron.38 Dividing 5-4, the
Supreme Court held that the FDCA precluded the FDA from regulating
tobacco products.39
In particular, the Court rejected the FDA's interpretation at
Chevron Step One. As the Court put it, "Congress has directly spoken
to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco
products."40 In reaching this holding, the Court explained that its Step
One analysis was "shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of
the question presented."41 The FDA had asserted authority "to ban
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco entirely,"42 but the Court maintained
that "Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion."43 In other words, the FDA had asserted a regulatory authority
whose implications were too significant to square with the subtle
statutory signals on which the agency relied.
36. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
37. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996).
38. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA., 153 F.3d 155, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (using
"traditional tools of statutory construction" under Chevron to evaluate the FDA's rule), aff'd, 529
U.S. 120 (2000).
39. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 120.
40. Id. at 160-61.
41. Id. at 159.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 160. The Court did not employ the elephants-in-mouseholes canon without careful
consideration of the statutory scheme. Nearly thirty pages of its analysis focused upon the FDCA
and subsequent legislation addressing tobacco. In the Court's view, the agency's construction
rested on "an extremely strained understanding" of the key text in the FDCA. Id. More
importantly, the Court concluded that subsequent "tobacco-specific legislation" had precluded the
FDA from regulating tobacco. Id. at 126. In addition, the Court applied the canon based upon the
major consequences of the agency's answer to the statutory question being considered. As the Court
again and again emphasized, the FDA had long taken the position that it lacked jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco. Its position shifted in 1996 with the rulemaking under review. And the answer
the FDA gave in 1996 particularly troubled the Court, which focused upon "the breadth of the
authority that the FDA ha[d] asserted." Id. In light of the legislative history and the agency's
"expansive construction" in 1996, the Court concluded that Congress had already "ratified ... the
FDA's plain and resolute position" that it could not regulate tobacco. Id. at 159.
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The elephants-in-mouseholes canon made its next major
appearance in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns.44 Among the
various issues presented by the case was a straightforward statutory
question: Did the Clean Air Act require the EPA to consider
implementation costs in setting national ambient air quality
standards? Siding with the EPA, the Court answered the question in
the negative, going so far as to suggest hat the statute "unambiguously
bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process."4 5 Any
contrary reading, the Court explained, would have "founder[ed] upon
th[e] principle" that Congress does not "hide elephants in
mouseholes,"46 as it was "highly unlikely" that Congress would have
used a few "modest words" to "give to the EPA . .. the power to
determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air
quality standards."47 The breadth of the regulatory power that the
challengers wanted the EPA to exercise was impossible to reconcile
with the small and subtle language that was said to support it. Hence,
as in Brown & Williamson, the Court rejected a posited interpretive
position on the ground that its regulatory implications were too "major"
to find a home in some isolated and insignificant textual language.
Not all of the Court's invocations of "majorness" have appeared
in the guise of the elephants-in-mouseholes metaphor. In
Massachusetts v. EPA,48 for example, the Court rejected the EPA's claim
that it lacked the statutory authority to regulate vehicular greenhouse
gas emissions under the Clean Air Act, with the Justices holding
instead that the statute unambiguously required the EPA to exercise
that authority. The George W. Bush administration had attempted to
leverage the "major questions" exception on its own behalf, claiming
that the statute's failure to grant such a significant regulatory
authority in express and unambiguous terms should have ended the
issue then and there. But the Court took the "majorness" calculus in the
opposite direction, holding that the administration could not rely upon
Brown & Williamson to "read ambiguity into a clear statute,"
particularly where doing so would allow an agency to avoid "curtail[ing]
the emission of substances that are putting the global climate out of
kilter." 49 The implication, in other words, seemed to be that the major
environmental consequences of not regulating greenhouse gases
44. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
45. Id. at 471.
46. Id. at 468.
47. Id.
48. 549 U.S. 497, 500-01 (2007).
49. Id. at 530.
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provided a sufficient reason to reject the Bush administration's
artificially narrow reading of the term "air pollutant."50 Once again,
then, the sensed majorness of an agency's regulatory position played a
role in shaping the assessment of that position's ultimate statutory
validity at Chevron Step One.5 1
Majorness-based reasoning has also played a role at Chevron
Step Two. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA provides a ready
example of the argument in action.52 Following Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Obama administration's EPA concluded that stationary sources of
greenhouse gases would need to comply with certain permitting
requirements under the Clean Air Act if they exceeded a threshold
amount of annual emissions.53 Regulated parties challenged the action
and found a receptive audience at the Supreme Court. The statute, the
Court held, might not have spoken directly to the precise question at
issue, but the agency's actions nonetheless qualified as an "outrageous"
power grab that was unreasonable at Chevron Step Two. 54 This was so,
moreover, in part due to the major implications of the agency's statutory
position: as the Court put it, the "EPA's interpretation is also
unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority without clear
congressional authorization."5 5 Accordingly, the Court rejected the
agency's attempt to claim an "extravagant statutory power over the
national economy."56
50. See Moncrieff, supra note 5, at 595.
51. It is also possible to read Massachusetts v. EPA as a straightforward Step One decision
in which the Court found the statutory language clear enough to support a concededly "major"
regulatory power. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA- From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 76 ("The simplest argument is that in MA v EPA, unlike in Brown
& Williamson, the relevant sections of the Clear Air Act were sufficiently clear to override even
the combined effect of Chevron and the major-questions canon."). This reading finds support, for
instance, in the Court's treatment of Brown & Williamson, which focused far more on
distinguishing the case away rather than leveraging its holding on behalf of the Court's conclusion.
Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 530-31 (noting that Brown & Williamson involved "at least
two considerations that have no counterpart in this case'). Either way, though, the important point
is that the framing of the majorness inquiry had everything to do with the presence or absence of
statutory ambiguity at Chevron Step One; it did not have to do with the question of whether the
Chevron framework was applicable in the first place.
52. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
53. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010).
54. Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Court read the EPA's rule as "patently unreasonable" because it raised the
threshold emissions level for the permitting requirements from the statutorily specified amount of
one hundred or 250 tons per year to one hundred thousand tons per year. Id. at 2444-45. By raising
the threshold, the EPA addressed the Court's concern that its rule would impose permitting
requirements on "millions[] of small sources." Id. at 2444. The Court thought that, by raising the
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These cases, to be sure, dealt with the variable of "majorness" in
different ways, but they all share the important trait of operating
within rather than outside of the Chevron framework. What none of the
cases do, in other words, is treat a statutory question's majorness as a
decisive reason to eschew Chevron in favor of genuinely de novo review.
This fact becomes especially apparent when one notes that just
two years before King, the Court rejected an invitation to craft a Step
Zero exception for "big, important" questions concerning an agency's
jurisdiction.57 In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Court declined to
recognize a "jurisdictional exception" to Chevron, which would have
required de novo review of all agency interpretations going to the
existence of an agency's regulatory jurisdiction.58 Chevron, Justice
Scalia explained for the Court, applied no less to "jurisdictional" than
to "non-jurisdictional" questions,59 and there was no good reason to
distinguish between "big, important" determinations, deemed
"jurisdictional," and "humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff," deemed to be
"nonjurisdictional."60 Rather, Justice Scalia emphasized, "[Tihe
question a court faces when confronted with an agency's interpretation
of a statute is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the
bounds of its statutory authority."61 And although Justice Scalia did not
say as much in City of Arlington, the Court's previous "major questions"
cases could all be understood in similar terms. Up to this point, in other
words, majorness had mattered only insofar as it informed the Court's
assessment of whether an agency had stayed within Chevron's
boundaries.62 Majorness had never provided a reason to replace those
boundaries with something else.
C. Majorness Outside of Chevron: The King Approach
Someday, we suspect, the political furor surrounding the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act will have died down. Future readers
may not, therefore, recall that the ACA, more commonly known as
"Obamacare," was a 2700-page statute pushed through an unusual
enactment process that resulted in drafting errors.63 They may not
threshold above the statutory amount, the EPA effectively conceded that its interpretation of the
permitting requirements was unreasonable. See id. at 2444-45.





62. Id. at 1868, 1871.
63. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 19, at 63.
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recall the political backlash of Obamacare's critics, the rise of the Tea
Party in the statute's wake,64 and the scores of attempted repeals of the
statute following the Republican Party's subsequent takeover of the
House of Representatives.65 And they may not remember the many
lawsuits filed immediately after the Act's passage or that the Supreme
Court, in a series of opinions by Chief Justice Roberts,66 left the Act
largely intact.
King v. Burwell was one of those decisions. In particular, the
Court in King rejected a challenge designed to limit the effectiveness of
federally established exchanges for the purchase of individual health
insurance plans.67 The Act requires the creation of a health insurance
"exchange" in each state and provides for tax credits to assist low-
income individuals and families in purchasing plans on these
exchanges.68 If it so chooses, a state may create and manage an
exchange for its citizens; otherwise, the federal government assumes
the responsibility of creating and managing such an exchange on the
state's behalf.69 The claim presented by the challengers in King was
that the ACA-owing to some odd and probably accidental language in
a definitional provision-did not authorize the IRS to pay out tax
credits to individuals who purchased health insurance on these
federally run exchanges.70 The IRS, in consultation with the
Department of Health and Human Services, disagreed with this
interpretation and had already promulgated a regulation making clear
that all qualifying individuals were entitled to subsidies regardless of
whether they purchased their plans on a state-run or federally run
exchange.71 The question thus presented by King was whether to
uphold the IRS's rule and the interpretation of the ACA that it reflected.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts answered the
question in the affirmative.72 But where many commentators expected
64. See David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform
and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873, 891 (2014) ("[T]he grassroots' complaint was
that the ACA in its entirety exceeded the legitimate role of the federal government.").
65. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 1774 (noting the introduction of over fifty pieces of
legislation aimed at repealing the ACA).
66. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483-84 (2015) (holding that the Affordable Care
Act permitted tax credits on federal exchanges); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2572-75 (2012) (holding that the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate was within
Congress's power to tax, but that provisions of the Medicaid program expansion were not valid
Spending Clause enactments).
67. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
68. Id. at 2485.
69. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(b)(1), 18041(c) (2012).
70. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
71. 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2016).
72. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
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a Chevron-focused analysis,73 the Court instead resolved the case in an
altogether different manner. The Court acknowledged that the key
statutory provision-Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code-could
plausibly be read to foreclose the IRS's rule, but it also highlighted
several countervailing signals within the statutory scheme as
supportive of the government's position.74 Thus, it concluded that the
statute was "ambiguous" with respect to the question of the IRS's
authority to issue subsidies in connection with federally run
exchanges. 7 5
What is remarkable about King is that the Court's
acknowledgment of and response to the statutory ambiguity occurred
entirely outside of the Chevron framework. Having characterized the
statutory language as ambiguous, the Court went on to explain as a de
novo matter why the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
government's position.76 Normally, of course, the statute's ambiguity
would have meant Chevron deference, as the Fourth Circuit had held.77
But the King Court concluded the question itself was too important to
warrant any application of Chevron at all. Its explanation for this
unexpected move spanned a total of one paragraph:
This is one of those [extraordinary] cases. The tax credits are among the Act's key reforms,
involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health
insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal
Exchanges is thus a question of deep "economic and political significance" that is central
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it
surely would have done so expressly. It is especially unlikely that Congress would have
delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance
policy of this sort.
In other words, because the question was a major one, it was a question
for the Court, and not the IRS, to answer. And that was so even where,
as the Court itself acknowledged, the relevant statutory language was
"ambiguous."79
73. See, e.g., Chris Walker, What King v. Burwell Means for Administrative Law, YALE J. ON
REG: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 25, 2015), http://yalejreg.comlnc/what-king-v-burwell-means-for-
administrative-law-by-chris-walker [https://perma.cclGGQ4-28C4].
74. As the Court explained, Congress didn't intend "to destroy" health insurance markets,
yet interpreting the Act to preclude tax credits on federal exchanges would do just that. King, 135
S. Ct. at 2496. And to destroy Congress's "plan" would be to derogate from the Court's basic duty,
recited again and again since Marbury v. Madison, "to say what the law is." Id. (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
75. Id. at 2492.
76. Id. at 2492-96.
77. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), affd, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
78. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (internal citations omitted).
79. Id. at 2492.
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King cited directly to both Brown & Williamson and Utility Air
as supportive of this interpretive move.80 Those cases, however, should
have received at most a cf. citation, as King leveraged the concept of
majorness in a manner that was different from what its predecessor
cases had done. Indeed, there are at least three important respects in
which King's version of the MQE departs substantially from the
"elephants-in-mouseholes"-type reasoning that its predecessor cases
reflect.
First, the Court in King evaluated majorness by reference to the
statutory question in the abstract, rather than by reference to any
particular answer that the agency had given. To the Court in King, the
agency's particular "take" on the statutory question proved irrelevant
to Chevron's applicability. In its previous "major questions" cases, by
contrast, the Court had concluded that the agency was stretching the
boundaries of its authority in a manner that carried significant
implications for the statutory scheme as a whole. We do not think, for
instance, that the Court would have identified a "major question" in
Brown & Williamson if the agency had disclaimed authority to regulate
tobacco under the FDCA, 81 nor do we think the Court would have
identified a "major question" in Utility Air82 if the agency had pursued
a less ambitious permitting program. But in King, the Court's
conclusion of majorness was antecedent o and independent of anything
the agency had actually done. On the Court's logic in King, any possible
resolution of the statutory question would have carried "deep 'economic
and political significance,'" and that fact was in and of itself sufficient
to bring the MQE into play. 83
Second, the Court did not carefully consider the statutory
scheme before reaching a conclusion regarding the question's overall
significance. Rather, its majorness conclusion derived from the
"political and economic significance" of the tax credits themselves, as
evidenced by their potential to "involv[e] billions of dollars of spending
each year" and "affect[] the price of health insurance for millions of
people."8 4 The Court's previous "major questions" cases could at least
80. Id. at 2489. King also cited Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266-67 (2006), for the
proposition that Congress would have not delegated interpretive authority to the IRS because it
"has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort." King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. Gonzales
can be read to support a major questions exception at Step Zero. But the agency's sweeping claim
of authority was but one of several reasons the Gonzales Court refused to defer. Unlike in King,
the Gonzales Court carefully parsed the statutory and regulatory scheme before deciding to
exercise independent judgment. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256-67.
81. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
82. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
83. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
84. Id.
794 [Vol. 70:3:777
2017] MINOR COURTS, MAJOR QUESTIONS 795
point to the existing statutory backdrop as a frame of reference-in
Brown & Williamson, for instance, the FDCA's silence regarding
tobacco regulation and other statutes' references to tobacco regulation
could be (and were) leveraged to demonstrate a disproportionate "fit"
between the agency's claimed authority to regulate tobacco and the
statutory language said to support it.85 But in King, the majorness
inquiry proceeded without any similar form of accompanying statutory
analysis. The Court's previous cases involved both the identification of
an "elephant" (i.e., a claim of agency authority) and a "mousehole" (i.e.,
a statutory framework within which that claim uncomfortably
resided).86 In King, by contrast, the Court saw an elephant roaming the
world at large.
Third, the Court in King saw majorness as a hard, "on/off"
trigger for, rather than a "soft" and nonexclusive guiding factor of, the
Chevron inquiry.87 Indeed, King for the first time applied the MQE as a
pre-Chevron device, citing to majorness and majorness alone as a
sufficient basis for withholding judicial deference altogether. Prior
cases, as we have already noted, cited to majorness as one of many
reasons to lessen the degree of deference afforded to an agency
interpretation-either at Step One or at Step Two. But King saw the
question's majorness as reason to ignore outright the agency's views.88
Thus, in addition to redefining the MQE's domain, King heightened the
MQE's decisional significance.
85. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160-61 ("It is therefore clear, based on the FDCA's
overall regulatory scheme and the subsequent tobacco legislation, that Congress has directly
spoken to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco products.").
86. To be sure, the King Court identified the tax credits as a "key" piece of the Act that was
"central" to the scheme's operation. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. But many agency cases that come
before the Court involve "key" statutory provisions; the Court's certiorari practice, after all, directs
it to consider a case's national importance. It is error, therefore, to make much of the Court's
references to the tax credit's importance in relation to the statute itself. Thus, although one might
see the Court's brief statutory references as a careful limitation on the scope of the MQE as it was
set forth in King, we are more skeptical.
87. Concededly, the Court in King did also point to the IRS's lack of expertise on matters of
healthcare policy as rendering the case an "especially" inappropriate vehicle for Chevron deference.
Id. But this argument is little more than a makeweight. As Kristin Hickman has argued, the
Court's reasoning makes little sense on its own terms. See Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps)
Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57-58. The IRS implements
any number of congressional public policy goals, including ones involving healthcare. The Chief
Justice's limited view of the IRS's expertise proves too much. Among other consequences, it would
make the Chief Justice's rejection of tax exceptionalism in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
& Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), more or less incomprehensible. In that case,
the Chief Justice held that the normal rules of administrative law apply to the IRS's statutory
interpretations. See Hickman, supra, at 57.
88. Indeed, the Court nowhere adverted to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944),
which counsels giving weight to an agency's views to the extent they have the power to persuade.
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Read for all it may be worth, King instantiated a new clear
statement rule at Chevron Step Zero. Unless Congress clearly states its
preference for agency resolution, it will be understood to have ousted
agencies from their Chevron role of resolving statutory ambiguity
whenever that ambiguity presents a "major" question.
D. King in the Courts Below
It is possible that the Court meant for King to be a one-off
exception to Chevron. Professor Kristin Hickman, for instance, is
certainly right to raise the possibility that the Chief Justice's colleagues
did not "intend[] to embrace the most sweeping interpretation of his
views."89 But, as she also rightly points out, "sometimes a decision will
take on a life of its own."90 Chevron did, after all.91 And we think it's
more than possible that litigants and lower courts will read King for all
it may be worth.
In fact, early signs indicate that something along these lines
may already be happening. There is a growing stack of briefs and
motions in the lower courts arguing that King has changed the
interpretive landscape by disallowing Chevron deference in cases that
otherwise would fall firmly within Chevron's domain.92 And federal
89. Hickman, supra note 87, at 69.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2015) ("Wyndham
submitted a Rule 28(j) letter arguing that LabMD does not merit Chevron deference because it
decided a question of'deep economic and political significance.' Wyndham's June 30, 2015 Letter
(quoting King v. Burwell .... )."); Complaint in Intervention and Application for Preliminary
Injunction at 1 54, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C (N.D. Tex. May 19,
2016), 2016 WL 3098094 ("The [Chevron] theory is that a statutory ambiguity is an implicit
delegation, but questions of 'deep "economic and political" significance' are exceptions to the
delegation rule." (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2480, 2489)); Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive,
and Monetary Relief at T 62, Texas v. United States, No. 7:15-cv-00151-O (N.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2015),
2015 WL 6395461 (same); Final Opening Brief of Intervenors Dixon Bros., Inc., Nelson Brothers,
Inc., Wesco Int'l, Inc., Norfolk Southern Corp., Joy Global Inc., Gulf Coast Lignite Coalition, &
Peabody Energy Corp. in Support of Petitioners at *4, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 21, 2016), 2016 WL 1605531 ("[The Supreme Court's decision in King v. Burwell, 135 S.
Ct. 2480 (2015), makes clear that Chevron deference would not apply here anyway."); Brief in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For a Preliminary Injunction, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. McCarthy,
No. 15-CV-369-CVE-FHM (N.D. Okla. July 1, 2015), 2015 WL 7894590 (arguing that "two-step
Chevron framework would not apply here" because the "statutory question" is major under King);
Amicus Curiae Brief of International Center for Law & Economics and Administrative Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *3-4, *7, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC,
No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 2015), 2015 WL 4698404:
[T]he Order should be rejected as exceeding the Commission's statutory authority and
as presenting and addressing major questions-questions of "deep economic and
political significance," see, e.g., King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 8 (2015)-that
can only be addressed by Congress.... Although this court addressed and rejected a
796
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judges are taking note.93 Consider United States v. Texas.94 In that case,
a group of states sued to stop President Obama's deferred action
immigration program. The administration defended the program, citing
Chevron. A federal district court preliminarily enjoined the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans ("DAPA") program, and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.95 It took only two sentences for
the Fifth Circuit to conclude that DAPA implicated a "major question"
under King:
DAPA would make 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens eligible for lawful presence,
employment authorization, and associated benefits, and "we must be guided to a degree
by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision
of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency." DAPA
undoubtedly implicates "question[s] of deep 'economic and political significance' that [are]
central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that decision to an
agency, it surely would have done so expressly."
9 6
In its threadbare reasoning, the Fifth Circuit was following the
Supreme Court's ignals. The court of appeals made an independent,
''common sense" judgment of the importance of the question and
concluded that it was too important for the agency to answer. And
although the Fifth Circuit would go on to apply Chevron-assuming
"arguendo"97 that deference was warranted-we suspect that its
estimation of the question's majorness nonetheless influenced its
interpretation of the statute before it.98
Consider also a U.S. District Court's recent decision in the case
of U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell.99 The case involves yet
another challenge to the Treasury Department's implementation of the
challenge to the 2010 Order on these grounds, the Supreme Court has in the intervening
months decided two cases-UARG and King v. Burwell-that revitalize the challenge,
especially given the 2015 Order's more aggressive posture.
93. See, e.g., Cmty. Health Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 113 F. Supp. 3d 197, 212 n.11 (D.D.C. 2015)
("The Supreme Court recently articulated an exception to Chevron that applies in 'extraordinary
cases . .. ." (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488)); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O'Malley, J., concurring).
94. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 181 (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489).
97. Id. at 182.
98. The Supreme Court, with eight Justices sitting, affirmed without opinion the Fifth
Circuit's judgment by an evenly divided vote. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). In
advancing our proposal, we have in mind a Court able to resolve major questions because it has a
full complement of Justices. But we do not think the current vacancy on the Court undermines the
force of our proposal that the lower courts should continue to defer to agencies under Chevron
notwithstanding the MQE; all else being equal, dysfunction in the Judicial Branch strengthens
the case for a regime of deference to administrative action. See also infra Part IV (discussing the
possibility of judicial dysfunction).
99. 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016).
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ACA, this time focused on the question of whether the Department may
use permanently appropriated (as opposed to annually appropriated)
funds to pay out a particular set of subsidies to insurance companies.
The district court did not even mention Chevron until the end of its
opinion. Only after first explaining why the statute prohibited the
relevant appropriations did the district court turn to the agency
officials' claim that "'at a minimum' they deserve deference to their
interpretation of [the statute]."100 To this argument, the district court
offered the following rejoinder:
The Supreme Court in King rejected the agency's Chevron argument. The Court had
previously recognized that in "extraordinary cases," there "may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended [the] implicit delegation" that underlies
Chevron deference. King was "one of those cases" because "tax credits are among the Act's
key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of
health insurance for millions of people." The Secretaries say the same thing about Section
1402 reimbursements. That being the case, "had Congress wished to assign th[e] question
fn n agency, it surely would have done so expressly." There is no express delegation
here.101
As in United States v. Texas, the district court would go on to make clear
that "[e]ven if Chevron deference were warranted, the Secretaries
would fail at step one."102 But its primary argument against the
government depended on the court's own judgment that major issues
were at stake.
These are only two cases,103 and we should be careful not to
make too much of them. King's MQE was only recently enthroned, and
100. Id. at 188.
101. Id. (internal citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. They are not, however, the only two lower court cases to make mention of King's MQE.
See also Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
368 (2016) ("This is not an 'extraordinary' case. Chevron applies." (internal citations omitted));
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 826 (9th Cir. 2016) (Seabright, J., dissenting):
[A]lthough the majority Opinion acknowledges that the term "relating to obstruction of
justice" in [the statute] is ambiguous, it refuses to give deference to the BIA's
reasonable, permissible, and plausible formulation at Chevron step two. But this type
of refusal should be reserved for "major" or "extraordinary cases." And unlike King's
challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, this is not an extraordinary
case.
(internal citations omitted); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283,
1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O'Malley, J., concurring) ("[T]here are times when courts should not search
for an ambiguity in the statute because it is clear Congress could not have intended to grant the
agency authority to act in the substantive space at issue. This is one of those extraordinary cases.");
Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. 4:16-CV-00731, 2016 WL 6879615, at *6 n.5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22,
2016) (preliminarily enjoining a federal overtime rule under Chevron Step One, while noting that
"the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court routinely strike down agency interpretations that clearly
exceed a permissible interpretation based on the plain language of the statute, particularly if they
have great economic or political significance" (emphasis added) (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2489 (2015))).
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we do not yet know how long or widely it will reign. But it is at least
possible that circuit and district court judges will grow increasingly
willing to ignore the Chevron two-step if and when the questions before
them seem major enough. The immediate post-King developments
indicate that lower courts are grappling with the question of how they
should incorporate King's MQE into their own resolution of future
administrative law cases. Precisely because King broke new ground, it
casts uncertainty over the scope of Chevron's domain. The Court may
very well have something to say about this uncertainty in the future.
But, for the time being, lower courts would best confront the confusion
by leaving the MQE in the Court's own hands.
II. THE CASE FOR SUPREME COURT EXCLUSIVITY
We have thus far argued that King v. Burwell reflects a
substantial rethinking of the MQE, according to which the sensed
political and economic significance of a statutory question provides a
sufficient basis for altogether ignoring the implementing agency's
answer to that question. Notably, however, King did not go so far as to
overrule Chevron, with the Court instead suggesting that Chevron
should continue to apply with full force in non-"extraordinary" cases.10 4
King thus raises the critical question of how lower courts should go
about distinguishing major from non-major questions.105
One might imagine a variety of complex approaches to this
inquiry. At a minimum, it would seem, any such approach would need
to identify factors of relevance to the variable of majorness, explain how
to evaluate those factors in a given case, develop a mechanism for
weighing those factors against one another, define a threshold point at
which the weighing process supports a conclusion of majorness or non-
majorness, and so forth. Ultimately, however, we believe that the better
approach to the question turns out to be much simpler. Rather than
attempt to probe majorness on a question-by-question basis, lower
courts should conclude that the MQE never applies to the statutory
questions that come before them.
Why should lower courts adhere to this approach? In a nutshell,
we argue that nothing stands to be gained from their doing so, while
something stands to be lost. More specifically, lower courts lack the
institutional features necessary to further the benefits of the MQE, and
any lower court involvement in the exception's implementation will
104. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
105. See Hickman, supra note 87, at 58 (noting that "[t]he Court's seeming curtailment of
Chevron's scope in King v. Burwell raises a host of questions for future cases").
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inflict unnecessary costs on litigants, agencies, and the courts
themselves. Accordingly, the Supreme Court and only the Supreme
Court should utilize the MQE as a decisionmaking tool. 106
A. Unrealized Benefits
Our proposal necessarily contemplates circumstances in which
the lower courts will extend Chevron deference to a statutory question
that the Court itself would review de novo. Normally, a disconnect of
this sort would provide cause for concern. If the lower courts adjudicate
cases in a manner that departs from prevailing Supreme Court
doctrine, then those courts will more often generate outcomes that the
Court itself regards as erroneous and requiring reversal. If, by contrast,
lower courts mimic the Court's approach to resolving statutory
questions, those courts will more often render decisions that the Court
would have no need to correct. Our proposal would thus seem to impose
on the Court the unnecessary work of reviewing decisions that it could
otherwise leave undisturbed.
Briefly stated, our response goes like this: however strong the
general case for vertical uniformity may be,107 it provides little reason
for lower courts to mimic the Court when the particular dictates of the
MQE are at issue. The major questions exception, we believe, is itself
an exceptional rule, and it is exceptional because, unlike most rules, its
underlying aims and purposes can effectively be put into practice by
only the Supreme Court. Put differently, we think that the MQE
operates as an ineffective-if not wholly impotent-tool when the lower
courts wield it, and we think that point remains true even under
circumstances in which all parties recognize the case as an
"extraordinary" one. That being so, lower courts do not in fact obviate
the need for Supreme Court review even when they "correctly" identify
a statutory question as major and resolve the question without
106. We should emphasize at the outset of this discussion that the target of our analysis is
the bolder, "Step Zero" version of the MQE that the Court applied in King-a version that points
to the significance of the question itself as a reason to withhold Chevron deference in the first place.
We can imagine some circumstances in which lower courts might have good reason to invoke the
narrower, elephants-in-mouseholes canon of Chevron Step One or to cite the majorness of the
agency's answer to the statutory question as a factor of relevance to Chevron Step Two. We should
also emphasize that our proposal treats the granting of cert as a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the MQE's application. We contend only that lower courts should never apply the
MQE. We do not contend that the Supreme Court must always do so.
107. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 865-66 (1994) ("[Tjhe values that inhere in a uniform interpretation and
application of law-in particular, I think, the cultural desire for a single authoritative voice within
the judiciary-strongly support inferior federal court (and state court) deference to Supreme Court
rulings.").
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Chevron-under those circumstances, we think the MQE's internal
logic would still require the Court to resolve the question de novo.
We believe, moreover, that the MQE is exceptional in another
respect; namely, it represents the rare rule whose "erroneous" non-
enforcement by lower courts should reliably generate corrective review
by the Supreme Court itself. This is so on account of the significant
degree of overlap that the concepts of "majorness" and "certworthiness"
share. If the Court regards a question as important enough to apply the
MQE, we think the Court should regard that same question as
important enough to require the attention of the Justices themselves.
Few, if any, statutory questions will carry a national "political and
economic significance" that is sufficiently "deep" to justify an
"extraordinary" departure from the Chevron framework,108 but not
"deep" enough to warrant an exercise of the Court's discretionary
jurisdiction to decide "an important question of federal law that has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court."109 If the divided courts in
King,110 Massachusetts v. EPA,111 and Brown & Williamson12 are any
indication, there is reason to think that "extraordinary" statutory
questions are also controversial on the merits and likely to garner the
votes of at least four Justices for certiorari. Consequently, lower courts
gain little-either for themselves, or for the judicial system writ large-
by attempting to determine on their own whether the Court would
classify a statutory question as major or not.
That is the gist of the argument. But o develop the argument
further, we need to think about why the Court has adopted the MQE
and what it is attempting to achieve with it. This is, unfortunately, a
point on which King provides little guidance, and we therefore must
108. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
109. Of course, the Court doesn't have the exclusive say-so as to whether a given case ends up
on its docket; the parties in that case must actually seek to put it there. And circumstances might
sometimes arise in which the parties themselves choose not to pursue (or fail to pursue) Supreme
Court review. Under these circumstances, lower court non-enforcement errors might end up
"sticking" even where the Court would choose to grant certiorari if it were able to do so.
One response to this objection might posit that "major questions" cases are relatively less likely
than the average case to end up in an "unpursued certiorari" posture. But regardless of whether
that claim is true, we think the risk of "unpursued certiorari" will always exist, whether or not our
proposal is adopted. If lower courts did choose to entertain MQE-based claims, they still would
commit errors that might sometimes evade Supreme Court review on account of one or another
party's decision not to petition for certiorari. The likelihood of this contingency strikes us as
unlikely to be materially higher or lower in the alternative regime. That being so, the risk of
"unpursued certiorari" no more undermines our proposal than it does the general practice of
relying on litigants to tee up issues for potential Supreme Court review.
110. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
111. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
112. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
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speculate somewhat about what the Justices might have had in mind.
In so doing, we have tried to be as charitable as we can to the Court,
advancing what strikes us as the best set of possible justifications that
one might offer on the MQE's behalf.113 Some of these justifications, we
concede, are more persuasive than others; indeed, we suspect hat some
readers will find all of them to be unsatisfactory and object that we are
being too charitable in trying to reconstruct rationales for the MQE. But
our aim is not to establish that the MQE itself reflects a good idea;
rather, it is to show that the idea--even when presented in its best
light-provides no reason for lower courts to involve themselves in its
implementation. 114
1. Intent
To the extent that King says anything at all about the MQE's
rationale, its justification appears to rest on an assumption about
congressional intent. Chevron itself, as the Court in King
acknowledged, derives from "the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in
the statutory gaps."s15 But that theory, the argument goes, might
113. We do not here consider the possibility that the MQE is intended to serve the strategic
goal of undermining Chevron deference in whatever way possible. In other words, the rationales
we consider here are rationales that attempt to make sense of the MQE in light of Chevron's
animating presumptions. It may be, of course, that the Court sees (or at least some of its Justices
see) the MQE in a more explicitly "anti-Chevron" light, intending for the exception to operate as
nothing more than a way station on the road to Chevron's ultimate demise. If so, then lower court
application of the MQE would indeed help to achieve the exception's true objectives. At the same
time, we are hesitant to attribute such a purpose to the MQE absent further guidance from the
Court to this effect. And we in any event believe that, to the extent that the Justices harbor doubts
about the overall wisdom of Chevron itself, they should pursue Chevron's elimination directly,
rather than chip away at Chevron through the clumsy and indirect mechanism of a doctrine about
"major questions."
114. Our overall argument holds true when we focus upon the D.C. Circuit, though its details
differ slightly. The D.C. Circuit plays a unique role in administrative law: its judges develop a
specialty in the subject during their tenure (or had one coming into the office), and in some cases
the Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over agency orders or rules. See Hon. Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Remarks upon Receiving the Lifetime Service Award of the Georgetown Federalist
Society Chapter, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-4 (2012). If any lower court is in a good position to
further the values of the MQE, it might be assumed the D.C. Circuit would be it. But despite its
unique features, the D.C. Circuit is not in a good position to implement the MQE. As with other
circuits, its precedents are at all times subject to reversal by the Supreme Court, which has
consistently shown unease about the aggressiveness of judicial review by the D.C. Circuit. And in
most cases the D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction is not exclusive, leading to the type of disuniformity in
regulatory policy that is inconsistent with the MQE's underlying concern for settlement. Finally,
as should become apparent as our argument progresses, most of the rationales for the MQE are
unrelated to the unique features of the D.C. Circuit. But see infra Part IV.C (positing a special role
for the D.C. Circuit in enforcing a dysfunction-based reformulation of the MQE).
115. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
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require rethinking in cases where the political and economic stakes are
especially high.116 We might suppose, in other words, that Congress
intends for an agency to fill in the details of technical, low-stakes
statutory provisions, but this inference becomes more difficult to
sustain where the relevant provisions concern "major" issues of public
policy. This intuition, we think, probably best accounts for the Court's
suggestion in King that "had Congress wished to assign [the] question
to an agency, it surely would have done so explicitly."1 17
This rationale strikes us as at best incomplete. The trouble is
that it fails to account for the Court's institutional role in answering the
major question posed. The intent-based argument posits that Congress
would rather have its own preferences prevail over those of an
implementing agency when the legislative stakes are high. That
premise, we think, is likely correct-indeed, as one congressional staffer
put it, legislators do indeed like to "keep all those [major questions] to
themselves."118 But a preference for congressional resolution of major
questions is different from a preference for judicial over agency
resolution of questions that Congress has left open.119
Put differently, "major questions" cases involve instances in
which Congress has failed to reveal what its preferences are. And thus
it is the absence of a clear congressional position that the Court must
confront.120 When Congress has not specified its position regarding a
116. Id. at 2488-89 (noting that "[i]n extraordinary cases ... there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation" (quoting Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159)).
117. Id. at 2489. This idea also finds expression in then-Judge Breyer's suggestion that
"Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving
interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute's daily administration."
Breyer, supra note 33, at 370.
118. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 1004 (2013) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1003 ("Our findings offer some confirmation for
the major questions doctrine-the idea that drafters intend for Congress, not agencies, to resolve
these types of questions." (emphasis added)).
119. Congress might make clear that while it prefers to resolve all major questions itself, it
would also prefer courts rather than agencies to step in whenever it fails to do so. We could imagine
Congress saying so in a wholesale way by amending the Administrative Procedure Act, or at the
retail level in individual statutes. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4
(2015) (discussing statutes that prescribe deference standards for the courts to apply). And were
Congress to do so, we would of course have no qualms with lower courts proceeding to follow
Congress's instructions. Our argument, in other words, is not that the Constitution bars Congress
from directing lower courts, rather than agencies, to resolve statutory ambiguity whenever it
involves a major question. Instead, our claim is simply that, in the absence of such action, we see
no reason to presume that Congress would wish for lower courts to act in that way.
120. Thus, as Cass Sunstein has put it, the actual choice presented in a "major question" case
isn't so much whether to accept an agency's resolution of a question or instead to accept the position
of Congress; rather the relevant choice is "whether to accept an agency's resolution or instead to
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major issue of public policy, a committed purposivist has no choice but
to try to discern who Congress would have wanted to formulate the
relevant policy in its stead. And we do not see any immediate reason
why the majorness of a given question would indicate a congressional
desire to accord interpretive primacy to courts rather than agencies-
especially where Chevron itself cuts in the opposite direction.
King's stated justification for applying the MQE thus requires
further elaboration; the Court held that "major" questions of statutory
interpretation should not trigger Chevron deference, but without ever
explaining why judges rather than agencies should be the ones that
occupy the statutory void. To the extent that Chevron rests on a judicial
fiction about congressional intent, that is all the more reason for a
reviewing court to consider whether it is better situated than an agency
to answer a major question. The question thus arises: Might there be
reasons to prefer judge-based rather than agency-based resolutions of
"major" statutory questions?121 If So, then the intent-based justification
for the MQE would be complete.
We think that such reasons might exist, and we will elaborate
further on those reasons in the sections to come. For now, however, it
suffices to say that even if Congress did wish for the Supreme Court to
enjoy interpretive primacy in the resolution of a "major question," it
rely on the interpretation chosen by a federal court." Sunstein, supra note 5, at 233; see also
Moncrieff, supra note 5, at 612 (questioning the view "that judges should review major questions
because reasonable legislators would not want to delegate those questions to agencies" on the
ground that "reasonable legislators urely would not want to delegate those questions to judges
either").
121. Congress, it might be objected, has signaled a preference that is inconsistent with our
proposal, namely, that lower courts apply the same standards of review of agency action as the
Court. The basis for federal question jurisdiction in agency cases i  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), which
makes no distinction between the Court and the lower courts, and the standard of review is set
forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012), which provides that a "reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law" and "shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." Taken together, these statutes might be read to signal Congress's intent
that all federal courts must apply the same standard of review when evaluating an agency's
statutory interpretation. In the context of Chevron, however, we think this objection reads more
into the APA and the general federal question statute than is there. As commentators have noted,
"much of administrative law," including Chevron, "is common law." Cass R. Sunstein, Factions,
Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 271 (1986); see Gillian E.
Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2012) ("The
Court's Chevron jurisprudence offers an even clearer instance in which the governing standards
for judicial review have been elaborated upon and transformed far from their textual roots in the
APA."). In elaborating a common law of judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, we
think the Court has layered a variety of "normative and functional concerns" onto sparse statutory
text. Metzger, supra, at 1312. Our proposal, which looks to functional distinctions between the
Court and the lower courts, is in no greater tension with statutory expressions of legislative intent
than Chevron itself.
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does not necessarily follow that Congress would feel the same way about
according the same primacy to a randomly selected panel of appeals
court judges,122 much less a single district court judge. The Court at
least has high public visibility, a resistance to forum shopping, and a
distinctive ability to enunciate nationwide propositions of law-all
traits that lower courts, even at the circuit court level, are far less likely
to manifest. To the extent that an enacting Congress wishes for judicial
actors to displace an agency's traditional role in answering major
statutory questions, we strongly suspect hat Congress has the Justices
of the Supreme Court-and not any other Article III actors-in mind. 123
2. Nondelegation
Perhaps the MQE makes sense as an indirect means of enforcing
constitutional limits on legislative delegations of power. The Article I
nondelegation rule may be defunct for the time being,124 but the Court
can and sometimes does use various non-constitutional rules of
administrative law as an indirect means of vindicating nondelegation
values.125 The MQE might operate as one such side constraint by
122. This assumption about congressional intent might have less force with respect o en banc
review, but we think the underlying intuition still holds.
123. Each of the arguments that follows can be understood in one of two ways. First, the
arguments might be viewed as standalone justifications for the MQE, which outweigh
countervailing (or neutral) considerations of congressional intent. Alternatively, the arguments
might be viewed as complementary to the intent-based claims, identifying reasons why Congress
might prefer for courts rather than agencies to answer the major question posed. We do not see
any significant material distinctions as flowing from these two framings and thus do not
differentiate between them in the discussion that follows.
124. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 119 (2011) (noting the rise and fall of the
nondelegation doctrine). But see Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-41
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for revival of the nondelegation doctrine).
125. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 9, at 228 (explaining Brown & Williamson in
nondelegation terms and arguing that "enforcing the nondelegation doctrine through the canon of
avoidance undermines, rather than furthers, the constitutional aims of that doctrine"). The
potential purposes of the nondelegation doctrine include preventing arbitrary lawmaking, see, e.g.,
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 516-19 (2003) ("The Court's approach to the
nondelegation doctrine can be made comprehensible when viewed in terms of arbitrariness . . . .");
securing liberty by promoting due process, see, e.g., Criddle, supra note 124, at 125-26, 126 n.23
("This Part develops Professor Rebecca Brown's insight that the nondelegation doctrine should be
viewed primarily as an expression of the Founding Generation's commitment to republican
liberty." (citing Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1553-55 (1991))); and ensuring political accountability, see, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 11, 14
(1993) (discussing the "blow delegation inflicts against democratic accountability"). Whichever
account of nondelegation one prefers, we think Supreme Court involvement is necessary for the
MQE to be a tool for indirectly implementing the nondelegation doctrine.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
limiting Congress's power to vest in agencies a major policymaking
power.1 2 6
The best version of the nondelegation argument, we think, goes
something like this: where Congress creates statutory ambiguity, it
delegates to some other institutional actor-courts or agencies, for
instance-the power to resolve that ambiguity. Most of the time, as
Chevron itself makes clear, we can regard this delegation as a
permissible transfer of executive authority to executive agencies. So
long as the statutory text supplies an "intelligible principle" to guide
agency discretion,12 7 agencies can, consistent with Article II, "execute"
the law by filling in details that the text has left unresolved. But, the
argument continues, some statutory questions are so important that
answering them necessarily amounts to an exercise of something more
than the mere execution of the law. When, in particular, a statutory
ambiguity implicates a "major question," the resolution of that
ambiguity starts to look more "legislative" in character. If so, then
according Chevron deference to agencies in "major question" cases
would authorize them to exercise a "legislative" determination that
properly belongs to Congress alone.12 8 And thus, by withholding
Chevron deference in such cases, courts refrain from validating an
exercise of authority that the Constitution disallows.
This nondelegation argument carries intuitive appeal, but it too
is incomplete. For one thing, the distinction between "major" and
"minor" questions does not well align with the traditional doctrinal
distinction between legislative and executive power. The former
distinction, it seems to us, goes to the significance of the consequences
that follow from a given policy determination, whereas the latter goes
to the breadth of discretion that goes into the making of that
determination. A seemingly "major" question, for instance, could still
involve a narrow range of discretion and thus satisfy the "intelligible
principle" requirement. (Consider, for instance, a statute that requires
an agency the authority to impose a year-long, nationwide curfew order
when various statutory criteria have been met.) And a seemingly minor
question might nonetheless involve a huge range of discretion and thus
fail to satisfy that requirement. (Consider, for instance, a statute
delegating to an agency the authority to impose a five-minute-long, site-
126. See Gluck, supra note 19, at 95 ("A robust major questions doctrine will function as a
strong nondelegation presumption.").
127. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
128. We might especially want to deny Congress the power to "pass the buck" on major
questions by delegating them to administrative agencies. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven
Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 270 (2010) (arguing
that failure to enforce the nondelegation doctrine has led to "a government of buck-passing").
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specific curfew order "whenever the agency wishes to do so.") To be sure,
the Court could always revise its nondelegation doctrine so as to treat
majorness and intelligibility as jointly relevant to the question of
whether legislative or executive power has been exercised.129 As
traditionally conceived, however, nondelegation doctrine provides little
support for the intuition that the "legislative" character of a statutory
determination meaningfully correlates with its majorness.
But even if a question's majorness does validly function to
heighten nondelegation concerns, the nondelegation argument for the
MQE confronts another difficulty; namely, it must explain why the
Court's resolution of the statutory question would avoid the same set of
nondelegation principles that beset an agency's attempt at doing the
same thing. The Court is just as much "not Congress" as an agency, so
one might regard the Court's involvement in answering the major
question as an equally problematic exercise of "legislative" power by a
non-legislative entity.13 0 If so, then the proper judicial response to an
unanswered major question should not be de novo resolution of the
question, as the MQE holds, but rather an invalidation of the statutory
provision that brought the question into being. 131
We do not mean to suggest that nondelegation principles apply
coextensively across agencies and courts. Powers are, after all,
"chameleon-like," in the sense that they can "take on the aspect of the
office to which [they are] assigned."132 Thus, we might identify some
reasons for concluding that Article III actors enjoy a greater degree of
constitutional leeway to resolve "major" ambiguities of statutory
language than do their administrative counterparts within the
executive branch. Any such argument, however, must demonstrate
relevant institutional differences that show why the federal courts may
receive from Congress a delegation of power that federal agencies may
not.
In the next two Subsections, we will posit two institutional
differences between courts and agencies that might help to complete a
delegation-based defense of the MQE. In attempting to demonstrate
129. There are suggestions of this approach in Whitman, which distinguishes "sweeping
regulatory schemes" from other schemes. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 ("But even in sweeping
regulatory schemes we have never demanded, as the Court of Appeals did here, that statutes
provide a 'determinate criterion' for saying 'how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.' ").
130. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 436 (2008) ("Although typically associated with
delegations to agencies, the constitutional principles on which the nondelegation doctrine is based
apply with full force to delegations to courts.").
131. Indeed, one might even argue that the invocation of the MQE itself qualifies as an
exercise of lawmaking power, and a "potentially" major one at that. Id. at 459.
132. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 749-50 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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why a court's resolution of "major questions" poses a less troubling set
of nondelegation issues than does an agency's resolution of the same,
we also end up demonstrating that the de novo resolution of "major
questions" at the Supreme Court level poses a less troubling set of
nondelegation issues than does the de novo resolution of "major
questions" at the lower court level. The Court is, unlike most other
Article III actors, a genuinely national and high-profile public
institution, whose role in shaping public policy is widely acknowledged
and accepted by the public at large. Its distinctive prominence, coupled
with its distinctive ability to settle contested issues of law, might help
to show why the Court's resolution of the "major question" turns out to
be more constitutionally appropriate than that of a particular
administrative body. But that argument does not carry over to other
Article III actors. Lower court judges are not appointed and confirmed
on the understanding that they will issue the last word on the most
pressing political and economic issues of the day, and they generally do
not issue nationwide mandates with legally binding effects.133 Thus,
just as we might distinguish for nondelegation purposes the
pronouncements of an inferior regional agency officer from those of the
agency's nationwide head,134 So too might we distinguish between the
pronouncements of an inferior federal tribunal and those of the entity
sitting atop the judicial hierarchy.
Our point is not to suggest that nondelegation values should
forbid lower courts from deciding any and all statutory questions that
carry significant policy consequences. Rather, it is to suggest hat if one
accepts the underlying premises of the MQE's nondelegation rationale,
one should regard lower courts' exercise of final, de novo judgment on
"major" questions as at least as troubling as the exercise of final, de
novo judgment by administrative agencies. To the extent that the
133. For a district court to order nationwide relief presents a variety of legal and prudential
concerns. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). This is why, for example, the Court has required district
courts to "take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate" before certifying a
nationwide class. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); see also Michael T. Morley, De
Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law,
and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 490, 494 (2016) (discussing
concerns with "Defendant-Oriented Injunctions" that "enjoin the defendant officials or agencies ...
from enforcing or implementing the challenged provision against anyone in the state or even the
nation").
134. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 201-02 (distinguishing among "exercises of ... authority based on the identity of the
final agency decision maker"); cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (upholding the
Social Security Administration's statutory interpretation after applying Chevron); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (declining Chevron deference for a United States Customs
Service tariff classification).
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nondelegation rationale carries persuasive force, it must rely on
institutional features that only the Supreme Court can be said to
possess.
3. Accountability (and Issue Salience)
The "accountability/salience" defense of the MQE would
maintain that the judicial resolution of "major questions" is uniquely
capable of thrusting those questions into the limelight, thus ensuring a
full public airing of the question and, by extension, a likelier
revisitation of the question by the public's representatives in Congress.
At first glance, this argument might seem to get things backward. The
MQE, if anything, would seem to undermine democratic accountability
by redirecting the resolution of a major question away from a more
politically accountable set of officials within the executive branch.135
Nevertheless, the MQE might still foster accountability by increasing
the salience of the "major question" asked and the "major answer"
given. Put another way, even if agency officials enjoy a stronger set of
democratic bona fides than their judicial counterparts, we might prefer
for courts to answer those questions if their doing so is more likely to
bring the relevant issue into the public limelight. In so doing, the MQE
might increase the likelihood that democratically elected officials in
Congress will consider the courts' answer and respond in accordance
with democratic preferences.
Thus, for instance, when the IRS first confronted the question at
issue in King (i.e., whether the ACA authorized the issuance of
subsidies to individual purchasers of health insurance on federally run
exchanges), its resolution of the question generated little (if any) public
attention outside the Beltway. But when the Supreme Court
subsequently considered the question, the Justices' deliberations (along
with the Court's answer to the question) were the subject of intense and
pervasive national attention.136 By deciding King, the Court thus
helped to raise the profile of the "major question"; and perhaps in doing
so, the Court increased the democratic legitimacy of the answer that it
gave. Congress's acquiescence to King, in other words, is now more
likely to reflect public approval for, rather than public ignorance of, the
answer the Court reached; the same inference might have been more
135. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 243.
136. See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Supreme Court Chief Justice Likely to Back Healthcare Law,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oe-0227-gorod-obamacare-scotus-
20150225-story.html [https://perma.cc/4CJA-3RTB] ("When the Supreme Court hears oral
arguments in King vs. [sic] Burwell next week, all eyes will be on Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr., to try to figure out which way he's leaning.").
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difficult to draw, however, if King had never arisen and the IRS
regulation had gone unchallenged. 137
This argument depends on empirical premises, which may or
may not be correct. It is at least unclear whether, as a general matter,
judicial review of "major questions" does in fact increase their salience
in an accountability-promoting manner, or whether a question's public
salience instead derives from factors unrelated to the identity of the
institution that decides it. It is also unclear whether de novo scrutiny
of a "major question" is in fact necessary to deliver the salience-
increasing benefits of judicial review. (King, for instance, would likely
have been a high-profile case regardless of whether the Court had
applied Chevron in resolving it; indeed, the case attracted significant
attention well before the Court announced its decision to jettison
Chevron analysis.) Even if, in other words, courts heighten the salience
of statutory issues by choosing to review agencies' resolutions of those
issues, it does not necessarily follow that abandoning the Chevron
framework is necessary to preserve the increased salience that judicial
review confers.
But whatever the correctness of those intuitions, it suffices to
note here that the "accountability" argument becomes much weaker
when the relevant judicial actor is a lower federal court. 138 Lower court
decisions-precisely because they are lower court decisions-typically
command far less public attention than do Supreme Court decisions.1 3 9
Thus, the idea that a lower court's exercise of de novo review will
usefully raise the profile of a "major question" strikes us as especially
implausible. If any judicial body is going to deliver on the
accountability-promoting benefits that this particular rationale
envisions, it is going to be the only Article III body whose judgments
enjoy a consistently high-profile nature.
137. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169
(2001) (counseling that courts should assume "congressional acquiescence to administrative
interpretations . . . with extreme care"); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARv. L. REV. 411, 433 (2012) (considering different arguments
for finding interbranch acquiescence).
138. See Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference, supra note 12, at 752 ("The interpretations
the Court did issue might be few enough and salient enough that Congress could fit them on its
agenda for possible legislative override-or at least this is much more plausible than it would be
for lower-court decisions.").
139. In general, it is doubtful whether any given federal court decision is particularly salient
for most Americans. Indeed, there is evidence that the Court's own decisions, much less the
decisions of lower federal courts, are largely in domains of moderately low salience." Frederick
Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L.REV. 4,41 (2006) ("[W]hen
we look at the world as ordinary Americans see it, we begin to understand that even when the
Supreme Court is at its most influential and most visible, the American people quite often have
other things on their minds.").
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4. Settlement
A related rationale for the MQE would point to the value of
settlement. On this view, the central problem with agency resolutions
of major questions relates to their relatively unentrenched nature.140
One presidential administration can reverse the regulatory judgments
of another administration, and this is no less true where the differing
judgments concern contested (but equally permissible) interpretations
of ambiguous statutory language.141 Courts rather than agencies should
resolve major questions for the simple reason that courts are better able
than agencies to render answers that are stable across time.
This argument rests on plausible empirical premises-we have
little doubt, for instance, that the Court in King ended up "settling"
more by resolving the question as a de novo matter than it would have
settled by upholding the agency's position as "reasonable" at Chevron
Step Two. 14 2 At the same time, the argument's normative premises may
be up for debate; namely, it is not altogether clear why we should desire
for major questions to receive a more permanent resolution than their
non-major counterparts. Perhaps, in fact, something more along the
lines of the opposite presumption should be true; the higher the stakes
of the policy choice, the less willing we should be to make that choice in
an administratively irreversible manner. 143
But even if the settlement-based rationale for the MQE is valid
on its own terms, it once again points to a set of benefits that only the
Supreme Court can deliver. The problem is that lower court resolutions
of major questions are no less "settled" (and in some respects more
unsettled) than agency resolutions of the same. This is so for several
140. The suggestion here is not that agency decisions are unentrenched in an absolute sense.
As illustrated by the literature on the ossification of agency rulemaking, for instance, many
commentators believe that some forms of agency action are too difficult to modify after the fact.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
60-62 (1995) (introducing the problem of ossification of the agency rulemaking process). The point
is that relative to legislative action, agency action is more susceptible to future modification by
future presidential administrations.
141. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 19, at 95 ("Deference to the agency would have meant that a
future IRS could have changed the rule at issue in King: such a holding would have kept the King
debate alive, and the ACA's future would have continued to be in doubt.").
142. To be sure, the Court did not need to invoke the MQE if settlement was its goal; a decision
at Chevron Step One would also have sufficed. But the MQE does at least enable the Court to settle
interpretive disputes where the statutory provisions at issue are genuinely ambiguous and are
thus non-amenable to a Step One resolution.
143. Indeed, there is a sense in which the settlement-based justification conflicts with the
accountability-based justification: whereas the accountability-based argument sees a question's
majorness as a reason to ensure ample democratic involvement in the reaching of its answer, the
settlement-based justification sees its majorness as a reason to short-circuit what might otherwise
be an ongoing political discussion.
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reasons. Most obviously, lower court judgments are reversible by the
Supreme Court itself-they do not enjoy the benefit of stare decisis
when and if the Court decides to take up the statutory question for
itself. Equally problematic, lower court judgments enjoy a limited
geographic scope of operation. District court precedents extend no
further than the particular cases to which they apply, and circuit court
precedents-though binding on district courts and future circuit court
panels-cannot bind other circuit courts when and if they confront the
same statutory issue. Indeed, absent Supreme Court intervention,
there arises the very real likelihood of a circuit split on the major
question posed.144 If the aim of the MQE is to furnish a stable and
settled resolution of ambiguous statutory language, Supreme Court
involvement in the process is all but required.
B. Unnecessary Costs
We have thus far argued that lower courts' implementation of
the MQE would do little to further the exception's animating values. To
this point one might plausibly respond: "Fair enough, but what's the
harm?" The likely pointlessness of the endeavor doesn't necessarily
provide a reason to avoid it.
But something more than pointlessness is at stake here. In
addition to leaving the MQE's prospective benefits unrealized, lower
court application of the MQE would be costly to both the lower courts
themselves and to various other parties that they interact with. If lower
courts must evaluate issues of "majorness" for themselves, their doing
so will generate decision costs related to the difficulty of specifying and
determining the applicability of the MQE, as well as error costs related
to the systematic over-enforcement of the exception (and, hence, under-
application of Chevron deference). When these costs are considered
alongside the absence of gains to be had from lower court application of
the MQE, the case for Supreme Court exclusivity becomes all the more
persuasive.
1. Decision Costs
If lower courts apply the MQE, they must be able to know when
to apply it. This will be difficult for them to do. The Court has not
attempted to define the line between major and non-major questions,
and we think the few indicia it has identified (namely, "political
144. This risk can be addressed partially by rules of exclusive jurisdiction or free use of class
actions, transfers, and multidistrict litigation, of course.
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significance," "economic significance," "extraordinariness," etc.145) will
be difficult for lower courts to work with in a coherent and predictable
fashion. 146 Thus, the most immediate costs that our proposal eliminates
are the costs of defining, communicating, and understanding the
domain of the MQE.
If lower courts must apply the MQE, then they need some
guidance as to how to go about applying it. The Court might try to
provide this guidance in concretized, rule-like fashion. That the Court
has not yet tried to do so suggests that the possibility of this approach
is more theoretical than real. It's tempting to try to distill the cases into
a checklist of characteristics: agency inconsistency,14 7 overlapping
delegations,1 48 the possibility of criminal liability based on the agency's
145. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
146. See Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L.
REV. 445, 451 (2016) ("[T]he Burwell opinion did not explain the bounds of the major questions
inquiry, providing little guidance for future applications."). The point is nicely underscored by
comparison of the MQE with other exceptions to Chevron. Agencies do not get Chevron deference
when they interpret criminal statutes or statutes, such as the APA, that they are not "charged
with administering." Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997). Nor do they get
deference when they decide that a statute does (or does not) create a private right of action.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-91 (2001). Applying these exceptions, while not without
difficulties, is far more determinate than applying the MQE.
The MQE also layers additional and far greater complexity on top of the Mead Step Zero
analysis. The Mead preconditions to Chevron deference are, first, that Congress has delegated
authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law and, second, that the agency used
that lawmaking authority when adopting the interpretation. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 226 (2001). Over time, the lower courts have worked out a set of presumptions under
Mead by tracking the formality with which an agency acted, tied to the APA's categories of agency
action. See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 677-79 (2014)
(noting that "various lower courts have set forth rules of their own concerning more specific
categories of agency action" that do and do not satisfy Mead's "force of law" requirement). Thus,
Mead's Step Zero analysis, while complicated, does not require what Chevron counsels against: an
independent, ad hoc judicial judgment about the political and practical stakes of the case as a
predicate to deference.
147. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 157 (2000) (noting that the
"consistency of the FDA's prior position [on the question of tobacco regulation] bolsters the
conclusion that when Congress created a distinct regulatory scheme addressing the subject of
tobacco and health, it understood that the FDA is without jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products
and ratified that position").
148. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006) (rejecting the Attorney General's broad
authority "given the Secretary[ of Health and Human Services]'s primacy in shaping medical policy
under the CSA").
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interpretation,1 4 9 the amount of money at stake ("billions"15 0) or
individuals affected ("millions" 15 1), and so on. But the more concretized
the criteria become, the less likely they are to capture the Court's
intuitive sense of the major/non-major distinction. We think the Court
has resisted "rulification" of the MQE precisely because its underlying
intuitions are not easily reducible to rule-like form.
We suspect, therefore, that the MQE will remain a standard.
The Court is likely to retain the vague verbal formulation it has
repeated in the major questions cases, labeling major questions ones of
"deep" or "vast" "economic and political significance."15 2 From a lower
court's perspective, this standard is not much better than a "use-your-
discretion" instruction; any attempt to apply it would entail significant
decision costs for lower courts, significant uncertainty for litigants and
agencies, and significant costs to the Court, which will be called upon
to correct the lower courts' errors.
Our proposal obviates the need for the Supreme Court to do any
of this. If the MQE remains the exclusive province of the Court, the
Justices can maintain a vague formulation of the exception's scope,
without inflicting decision costs on the judges, litigants, and agencies
involved in lower court cases. The MQE's applicability at the Supreme
Court level will remain unpredictable, but that unpredictability will
affect only the small number of cases that the Court decides to hear
each year. And the Justices can enjoy an added degree of flexibility in
delineating and applying the MQE, knowing that any adverse
downstream effects will remain cabined by the exception's nonexistence
in the courts below.153
The Court's certiorari practice provides an illustrative analogy.
The standards for granting certiorari are notoriously unclear, and it is
149. Cf. id. at 262:
It would be anomalous for Congress to have so painstakingly described the Attorney
General's limited authority to deregister a single physician or schedule a single drug,
but to have given him, just by implication, authority to declare an entire class of activity
outside the course of professional practice, and therefore a criminal violation of the
CSA.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
150. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Our argument, to be clear, is not that the decision costs associated with the MQE are
sufficient to justify our proposal of Supreme Court exclusivity. Countless legal standards entail
decision costs and that fact alone does not mean that courts should avoid applying them. What
makes the MQE unique, we believe, is the absence of upside potential to be gained from lower
court application of the exception. It is not, in other words, the prospect of decision costs alone that
justifies our proposal; rather, it is the prospect of incurring those costs for no good affirmative
reason.
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for this reason often difficult to predict whether the Justices will choose
to review a case. But the vagueness of these standards does not saddle
the lower courts with decision costs, because the lower courts do not
play any role in evaluating a question's certworthiness. What is more,
we suspect hat the Justices do not actually spend much time grappling
with these standards on a case-by-case basis, much less attempting to
achieve docket-wide coherence across all of their decisions to grant and
deny certiorari. Rather, the Justices can "go with their gut" in reviewing
petitions for certiorari, without too much worrying about or attempting
to control the system-wide implications of such a decision.154 If, by
contrast, lower courts were actively involved in flagging cases for
Supreme Court review, we would expect to see a sharp rise in the
decision costs associated with the application and development of these
standards, not just at the lower court level but also at the Supreme
Court itself. What our proposal seeks to do is to make the decision costs
associated with the MQE more like the decision costs associated with
the granting or denial of cert.
The reduction in decision costs, moreover, would occur not just
at the "Step Zero" phase of the Chevron inquiry. In addition to obviating
the need for courts, litigants, and agencies to argue and/or worry about
whether Chevron will apply, our proposal will reduce the decision costs
that lower courts experience when addressing the merits of a statutory
case. The Chevron framework, as Professor Tom Merrill has suggested,
helps lower courts to economize on decision costs.15 5 When reviewing an
agency's statutory interpretation, a federal judge does not need to labor
to specify the "best" reading of the statute. Instead, she needs only to
confirm that the agency's view is reasonable and not clearly at odds
with Congress's intent. The MQE, by contrast, increases decision costs
by requiring a judge to distinguish major from non-major questions and
to identify the best answer to major questions. And thus, by eliminating
the MQE from the domain of lower courts, our proposal reduces the
154. See Adam D. Chandler, Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth
Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121 YALE L.J. 725, 727 (2011) (noting, for purposes of the certiorari
standard, that "[t]he Court rarely offers guidance on what it thinks is important, and there is no
scholarship that illuminates how the Court uses the 'importance' criterion in practice"); see also
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
221 (1991) ("Fundamentally, the definition of 'certworthy' is tautological; a case is certworthy
because four justices say it is certworthy." (quoted in Chandler, supra, at 736 n.51)).
155. Merrill, supra note 6, at 753 ("Chevron's appeal for the courts rests in significant part on
its ease of application as a decisional device."). That is not to deny the difficulties of applying
Chevron's two steps. For example, it may be difficult for a judge to accept, and to explain, how an
agency's interpretation is a "permissible" though not the "best" one. Breyer, supra note 33, at 372-
74. But by comparison with de novo review or Skidmore weight, Chevron reduces decision costs by
directing courts to focus upon two questions. Merrill, supra note 6, at 753.
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incidence of the more mentally taxing analysis that de novo review
demands. 156
2. Error Costs
Given the uncertainty of the MQE, we can also expect imperfect
lower court enforcement of the exception. And given the inherently
certworthy nature of genuinely "major" questions, we can further expect
enforcement errors to skew in the direction of over-, rather than under-
enforcement. If, in other words, lower courts involve themselves in the
application of the MQE, we believe they will inflate the scope of the
exception beyond whatever boundaries that the Supreme Court has
intended.1 57
If the MQE applies in lower courts, lower courts can erroneously
apply the exception in one of two ways: (1) they can decline to apply the
MQE to (and thus review under Chevron) a question that the Court
itself would regard as "major"; or (2) they can apply the MQE to (and
thus review de novo) a question that the Court itself would regard as
"minor." If lower courts adhere to our proposal, they will only ever
commit the former sort of "over-deferring" error. By never applying the
MQE, they will sometimes defer to agency positions that the Court itself
would scrutinize de novo, but they will never commit the converse,
"under-deferring" error of withholding deference from a question that
the Court itself would scrutinize under Chevron. That asymmetry
might at first glance look troubling, but we do not view it as a significant
cause for concern. And the reason has to do with the likely exercise of
156. Our proposal reduces decision costs in another way as well. By reducing the overall
incidence of the MQE, our proposal helps to reduce the extent of the decision costs that derive
directly from the exception's existence. Among other things, for instance, litigants will far less
frequently have to spar over the question whether the MQE applies in a given case, and agency
officials can spend less time deliberating over whether a given regulation is likely to qualify as
"major" in court. See Monast, supra note 146, at 476 (raising the possibility that the MQE will chill
agencies from proceeding with rulemaking).
157. Our proposal thus retains Chevron's disciplining function in the lower courts, as
described by Peter Strauss. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 1118. When applying de novo review,
lower courts may interpret regulatory statutes differently than the agencies charged with
administering them and differently than each other. Balkanization in national regulatory
programs is undesirable for several reasons, including regulatory efficacy and fairness to regulated
parties and beneficiaries. Writing in 1987, Strauss observed that the Court's capacity to correct
lower court balkanization was under strain, which would make Chevron deference attractive as a
way to centralize policymaking in agencies. Id. at 1121-29. If anything, his insights apply even
more forcefully today than in 1987, as the Court takes fewer cases per year than it did then.
Building upon Strauss's insight, our proposal would allow the Court to decide major questions in
"extraordinary" cases while preserving Chevron's check on variable outcomes in the lower courts.
Cf. Pierce, supra note 12, at 1313-14 (suggesting the possibility of "[r]educ[ing] or eliminat[ing]
deference in Supreme Court decisionmaking . .. [while] retain[ing]" Chevron in the circuit courts).
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direct Supreme Court review to correct over-deferring errors by the
lower courts. By definition, these errors will involve statutory questions
that the Court itself would regard as "major," and we think that most
such questions should for that reason reliably trigger the exercise of
discretionary Supreme Court review.15 8 Thus, while our proposal will
sometimes cause lower courts to over-defer under Chevron, most of their
errors in this direction will yield reliable correction from the Supreme
Court.
Under the alternative regime in which lower courts can apply
King, both over- and under-deferring errors are likely to arise. For
reasons we have already discussed, the over-deferring errors should
continue to trigger reversal by the Court itself. By contrast, the under-
deferring errors will less often trigger cert grants (and, hence, reversal).
The erroneous invocation of the MQE, after all, will involve statutory
questions that the Court regards as "minor" and thus less worthy of a
place on the Court's limited docket. That's not to say that such errors
could never occur in certworthy cases, but it is to suggest that-in
contrast to over-deferring errors-under-deferring errors will involve
questions that are inherently less likely to trigger Supreme Court
review. In this regime, then, we can expect to see the Court reliably
correcting one set of errors while only sporadically correcting the other
set of errors, with the end result being a gradual expansion of the MQE
in the courts below. Under our proposal, by contrast, lower courts would
only ever over-defer, and most (if not all) of their errors in this direction
would receive prompt correction from the Supreme Court itself.
158. We cannot definitively prove, of course, that four Justices will reliably vote to grant
certiorari in major questions cases. The concept of majorness is amorphous, and commentators
have offered similar observations regarding the Court's certiorari standards. See, e.g., Kathryn A.
Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011)
(noting that "the Court makes its certiorari decisions free of any constraining legislative criteria
that might differentiate those cases that merit certiorari from those that do not"). It is therefore
possible that some underenforcement errors might go uncorrected, and there would exist a
category of cases in which the Court regarded a lower court's invocation of the MQE as incorrect
but nonetheless unworthy of its time. Nevertheless, we have difficulty envisioning any sort of




The following table summarizes the idea:
Operative Lower court practice: Supreme Court Outcome:
rule: practice:
Lower courts Lower courts err only by over- Supreme Court Scope of MQE
may not apply deferring. corrects most (if remains
the MQE: not all) over- stable.
deferring
errors.
The foregoing discussion helps to explain why a regime
permitting lower court application of King is likely to yield error
asymmetries, even where the lower courts over- and under-enforce the
MQE at equal rates. But the asymmetries would obviously worsen if the
lower courts under-deferred more often than they over-deferred. We can
only speculate as to what lower court judges would ultimately do, but
there is some basis for suspecting that they would tend to err on the
side of under-deferring, thus exacerbating the system-wide asymmetry
that we have already posited.
Part of the problem may stem from judges' desire to avoid
Supreme Court reversal; 15 9 if a lower court judge knows that the Court
is more likely to grant cert in cases involving "major" rather than
"minor" questions, the lower court judge would be better off
characterizing a borderline question as major rather than minor. Either
the judge is correct, in which case the Court is likely to grant cert and
also apply the MQE; or the judge is incorrect, in which case the Court
is unlikely to grant certiorari in the first place.
159. We assume that the desire to avoid reversal plays at least some role in lower court judges'
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence
from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 63 (2002) ("To the extent that the choice of a
judicial instrument affects the ability of others to reverse the court, it becomes a strategic variable
in the court's decision."); Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's
Decision-Making, 39 MERCER L. REV. 937, 949 (1988) (describing "[t]he inevitable narcissistic
desire not to be reversed" as an important psychological aspect of trial judge decisionmaking). In
making this assumption, we recognize that the empirical evidence "is somewhat mixed," with "the
majority of recent studies find[ing] that self-interest concerns, such as promotion desires and
reversal aversion, influence the decisionmaking of judges with permanent tenure." Joanna
Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and
Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753, 1759.
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There may be a more complex psychological dynamic to the
problem as well. In particular, what the Court said of the
jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional distinction in City of Arlington might
also apply to the major/non-major distinction in King:
Savvy challengers of agency action would play the [major questions] card in every case.
Some judges would be deceived by the specious, but scary-sounding, [major/non-major]
line; others tempted by the prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning
of ambiguous statutory commands. The effect would be to transfer any number of
interpretive decisions-archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to construe an
ambiguous term in light of competing policy interests-from the agencies that administer
the statutes to federal courts. 160
The MQE requires a judge to ask whether the question itself is
politically salient and practically important whenever she reviews an
agency's statutory interpretation. Asking this question, we suspect,
makes it more difficult for a judge to internalize the deference norm
that Chevron directs. The MQE signals that a judge should let her
independent policy assessment be her guide. Chevron, by contrast, calls
upon a judge to bracket her independent policy judgments, which may
be hardest to do when the judge perceives the case to have high political
or practical stakes.
If these signaling effects take hold, we can expect more lower
court errors in regulatory cases.161 For those who understand Chevron
in terms of congressional intent, over-enforcement of the MQE will
mean that lower courts will decide questions that Congress meant for
agencies to decide. And for those who think of Chevron in terms of
comparative institutional competence, erroneous applications of the
160. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013).
161. The prospect of lower court overenforcement might not be troubling if we assume that
the choice between Chevron and de novo review does not matter for substantive outcomes. Many
administrative law scholars suspect, and some have argued based on empirical data, that the
different standards of review do not matter for outcomes in administrative law cases. See, e.g.,
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010). We think, however, that Chevron
has at least modest effects on judicial review in the lower courts, though perhaps not in the
Supreme Court. See Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2808848
[https://perma.cclQNG5-9RZZ] (reaching this conclusion); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099, 1117-19 (2008) (finding that
the Court's choice between Chevron, Skidmore, and de novo review has a modest or even negligible
effect on the rate at which the Court reverses an agency's action); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823, 826, 859 (2006) (concluding that Chevron may have a "dampening" effect on ideological
decisionmaking in lower courts, depending on panel composition). It follows that a contraction of
Chevron's domain in the lower courts through application of the MQE would change substantive
outcomes.
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MQE are troubling because courts, which lack agency expertise, are
more likely to make regulatory mistakes.16 2
These regulatory mistakes by lower courts will, moreover, be
more entrenched than under our proposal. Typically, agencies can
change course under Chevron when circumstances change. In National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, the
Court held that a "court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if
the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion."16 3 Thus, when a statute is ambiguous, and it presents a
Chevron-eligible question, an agency is not bound by a prior judicial
interpretation of that ambiguity. This agency flexibility is lost, however,
when the MQE applies. King directs a court to fix the meaning of an
admittedly ambiguous statute when the question is major. An agency
cannot deviate under Chevron because a major question is not Chevron-
eligible.
The MQE, in short, is a rule whose animating values can
effectively be furthered by only the highest court in the land, but whose
costs will be realized by any court in the land. Those two features of the
rule, when viewed together, support the conclusion that the MQE
should remain the exclusive province of the Supreme Court.
III. SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED
We have thus far suggested that lower court involvement in the
MQE's application is unlikely to yield much in the way of benefits while
simultaneously giving rise to a variety of unnecessary costs. But we
have not yet considered whether our alternative proposal carries some
unwarranted downsides. In this Part, we thus consider and rebut six
potential objections.
162. King signals to lower courts that they should disregard the agency's views entirely, not
even giving them Skidmore weight. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (explaining
that "our task [is] to determine the correct reading of Section 36B" without referring to Skidmore
or considering the agency's view).
163. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(emphasis added).
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A. Percolation Lost
An initial objection to our proposal involves the familiar
"percolation" process through which lower courts contribute to the
development of Supreme Court doctrine. Lower court decisionmaking
can sometimes benefit the substance of the Supreme Court's case law,
for the simple reason that, as lower courts "apply existing Supreme
Court law to new and unforeseen fact patterns . . . , [they] provide a
substantial information base for the Court to consider when
contemplating further doctrinal reforms."164
Our proposal disrupts the percolation process in two ways. First,
by preventing lower courts from evaluating the "majorness" of a given
statutory question, our proposal limits their ability to contribute to the
Court's implementation of the MQE. Second, by requiring lower courts
to decide "genuinely" major questions under Cheuron, our proposal
limits their ability to contribute to the Court's independent resolution
of the major questions themselves. Conversely, if lower courts can and
do apply the MQE for themselves, the Supreme Court is more likely to
benefit from their input in delineating the criteria of majorness and in
resolving "major" statutory ambiguities.
Although we concede that our proposal is likely to carry these
consequences, we think that the forgone percolation-based benefits will
not be especially great. To begin, the second "merits-based" problem
strikes us as especially minor. Just because a lower court has applied
Chevron to evaluate a question that the Court will review de novo does
not mean that the lower court's statutory analysis will necessarily prove
useless to the Court's analysis. To the contrary, the lower court could
develop insights about an ambiguous statute at Step One or Step Two
that might still be illuminating to the Court when it resolves the
ambiguity for itself. This is, after all, precisely what happened in
King.165
As to the forgone percolation of issues related to the scope and
substance of the MQE, we think a couple of points are in order. First,
because under our proposal the Court would have no need to develop
concretized guidance regarding the MQE's applicability, we do not
think that the need for outside input will be especially great. Second,
164. Coenen, supra note 146, at 683; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court
Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 481-501 (2012).
165. In King, both the majority and dissenting opinions contained multiple citations to a D.C.
Circuit opinion on the statutory question, and they did so even though the D.C. Circuit had




nothing in our proposal prevents lower court judges from using dicta
and/or separate opinions for the purpose of noting that a given question
strikes that judge as major or non-major. That practice would not much
differ from the existing, non-binding mechanisms by which lower court
judges "signal" to the Court that it should grant certiorari in a given
case, consider reevaluating one of its past precedents, or take some
other action that the lower court itself is powerless to pursue. 166 We are
thus confident that our proposal still leaves room for the lower courts
in other ways to support the Court's implementation of the MQE.
B. Reliance
Reliance interests provide another potential reason to worry
about withholding the MQE from the lower courts' domain.
Disuniformity can always foster uncertainty, and our proposal, it might
be said, invites uncertainty by prescribing disuniformity as between the
Supreme Court and the lower courts. 167 Suppose, for instance, that an
agency has interpreted Law A to permit a contemplated course of
conduct, and suppose further that a lower court has upheld the agency's
interpretation as reasonable under Chevron. Under our proposal,
private parties have no ironclad assurance that the agency's reading
would prevail if and when the Supreme Court reviews it. At the Court,
after all, the MQE might justify the withholding of Chevron deference,
and a de novo reading of the statute might compel a different answer to
the statutory question on its merits. Under the regime we propose,
litigants would be less able to rely on the lower court's decision as a
definitive statement of what the law allows.
We believe, however, that the reliance-based critique of our
proposal proves too much. Ambiguous statutes by their nature create
uncertainty, and that uncertainty will pose a challenge to party actors
regardless of what our proposal prescribes. Even if lower courts strived
to mimic the Court's application of the MQE, public and private actors
would still struggle to predict (a) which particular lower court (and
which panel of judges on that court) would decide the issue they care
about; (b) whether the lower court would err in applying (or not
applying) the MQE to the statutory question at stake; (c) whether,
166. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685-714
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (signaling through a lengthy dissent that separation
of powers questions in the case were "important" and "unique"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 561
U.S. 477 (2010).
167. See Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 HOUS. L.
REV. 1321, 1329, 1339 (2016) (highlighting the relationship between high and lower courts in
discussion of "uncertainty about the content of the law").
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having applied the MQE, the lower court would resolve the statutory
ambiguity in the manner the parties preferred; and (d) in the event that
(b) or (c) is true, whether the Supreme Court would care enough about
the lower court's error(s) to intervene in the case. And that is to say
nothing of the myriad other changes in lower court precedent, Supreme
Court precedent, regulatory treatment, or statutory text that might in
the meantime affect the legality of the contemplated conduct.
Uncertainty is already baked into the system of judicial review of
agency action.168 Anything our proposal adds to the mix would be at
most negligible.
And that is especially so when one remembers that the MQE-
by definition-applies only in "extraordinary" cases. There will not be
many cases in which the lower courts will "erroneously" withhold
application of the MQE, and when the Court regards a question as
major, it quite likely will step in to clear up any uncertainty.
Conversely, when the Court declines to review a Chevron case, that
action will provide reason to think that the Court does not regard the
question as major and thus, to some extent, indicate a reduced
likelihood of Supreme Court intervention down the road. All of these
factors suggest that the reliance-related effects of the Court's decision
to label a question as "major" will not depend on whether lower courts
have done so as well.
C. Tradition
Wholly apart from reliance interests, another objection would
go, we should eschew the vertical disuniformity prescribed by our
proposal as too weird to warrant serious consideration from the lower
courts. The federal judiciary, this argument would contend, has
operated for many years under a regime of strict vertical uniformity,
and we should avoid any proposal that would depart from that
tradition. 169
Of course, one can always question the wisdom of adhering to
tradition for tradition's sake: that something has been one way in the
past is hardly a reason not to change it going forward. Ultimately,
however, the tradition-based objection to our proposal suffers from a
168. Cf. Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 468 (2008) ("Uncertainty is prevalent in legal contexts."); Kelly
Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109,
1125-26 (2010) (discussing "conflicting preferences regarding the form of legal rules" as an
endogenous source of uncertainty in the patent system).
169. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 361 (2006) (arguing
for the wisdom of tradition when it comes to separation of powers questions).
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more fundamental flaw. Simply put, the "tradition" on which it relies is
more tolerant of vertical disuniformity than the argument would have
us believe.
This point becomes clear once one recognizes that the MQE is a
doctrine about the power of a court to override an agency's reading of
its enabling statute. Chevron says that when an agency reasonably
construes a statutory ambiguity, courts lack the power to displace the
agency's construction with an alternative construction of their own.
King creates an exception to this rule, directing courts to adopt their
own construction of statutes in "extraordinary" cases. We propose that
the lower courts should not wield this power even though the Supreme
Court might.
This type of vertical disuniformity is part of the federal courts
tradition. Vertical disuniformity exists with respect to secondary rules
regulating the respective adjudicatory powers of the federal courts. The
Supreme Court may overturn its own precedents; lower courts may
not. 170 The Supreme Court may establish nationally binding law; circuit
courts may not.171 District courts may find facts in the first instance;
appeals courts may not. 172 The Supreme Court may declare that a "new
rule" of constitutional law applies retroactively to petitioners bringing
successive petitions for collateral relief; circuit courts and district courts
may not. 173 Perhaps most on point, the Supreme Court has held that it
alone has the power to create "clearly established" law governing the
application of constitutional rights-law that, under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, provides the basis for granting federal
habeas relief to petitioners challenging state court convictions.174 And,
although the issue has remained open, the Court has similarly hinted
at the existence of an exclusive power to declare "clearly established
law" in the context of qualified immunity determinations as well. 175 We
170. See, e.g., United States v. Nava-Perez, 242 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e cannot
overrule Supreme Court precedent.").
171. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1999) ("While we carefully
and respectfully consider the opinions of our sister circuits, we are not bound by them.").
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
173. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001) (noting, for purposes of Section 2244(b)(2)(A)
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, that "[tlhe new rule becomes retroactive,
not by the decisions of the lower court or by the combined action of the Supreme Court and the
lower courts, but simply by the action of the Supreme Court").
174. See, e.g., Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014) ("As we have repeatedly
emphasized ... circuit precedent does not constitute 'clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.'" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012))).
175. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665-66 (2012) (assuming "arguendo that
controlling Court of Appeals' authority could be a dispositive source of clearly established law in
the circumstances of this case"); see also Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam);
Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV.
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can think of other examples as well. 1 76 In sum, if we ask whether
different federal courts exercise different degrees (and forms) of judicial
power, we very quickly arrive at an affirmative answer.
Hitting even closer to home, vertical disuniformity may already
be reflected in Chevron's application on the ground. Professors Kent
Barnett and Chris Walker have recently compiled data suggesting that
the Supreme Court's "version" of the Chevron test affords far less
deference to agencies than the lower courts' version of it; simply put,
even though all courts purport to apply the same Chevron two-step,
lower courts are significantly more likely than the Supreme Court to
uphold agency constructions when applying that test.17 7 Barnett and
Walker's findings indicate that our proposal may simply serve to
formalize a phenomenon that already exists as a real-world matter.
Moreover, some of the values that explain our system's usual
preference for vertical uniformity will be advanced by our proposal.
Consider, for instance, stare decisis. One justification for the practice of
precedent, including binding lower courts to Supreme Court
pronouncements of law, is that it reduces "the potential for political
decisionmaking."178 One of our principal concerns about the MQE is its
HEADNOTES 62, 71 (2016) (highlighting "the Court's recent hints that § 1983 plaintiffs may need
controlling Supreme Court precedent to defeat a claim of qualified immunity").
176. Indeed, the Court's recent decision in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
566 U.S. 478 (2012), raises the possibility that the Court has something similar in mind in
connection with another Chevron-related rule. In that case, the Court confronted a variation of a
question it had previously considered in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005); namely, when a federal court construes an enabling statute
before the implementing agency construes it, what effect, if any, should the prior judicial
construction exert on the subsequent agency construction? In Brand X, the Court held that the
prior judicial construction should bind the agency "only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute ..... Id. at 982. But in Home
Concrete, the Court nonetheless bound an agency to a prior statutory construction that did not
purport to enforce the statute's "unambiguous terms." Home Concrete, 566 U.S. 478, 483-84.
Different members of the majority offered different justifications for these divergent outcomes, and
it is not altogether clear what Home Concrete signifies regarding the present-day scope of the
Brand X presumption. But one possibility, raised by some commentators, is that the applicability
of the Brand X presumption now depends on whether the prior judicial precedent was issued by
the Supreme Court or by a lower court instead. See, e.g., The Supreme Court-2011 Term: Leading
Cases, 126 HARv. L. REV. 176, 376 n.90 (2012); Wesley Sze, Note, Did X Mark the Spot: Brand X
and the Scope of Agency Overrides of Judicial Decisions, 68 STAN. L. REV. 235, 262 (2016); cf. Brand
X, 543 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Brand Xrule "would not necessarily
be applicable to a decision by this Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing
ambiguity").
177. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 161 (manuscript at 5); see also Bruhl, Hierarchically
Variable Deference, supra note 12, at 760 (noting that "there are some circumstantial and
structural reasons to suspect that the Supreme Court is less deferential than lower courts").
178. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics"ofJudging: Dispelling
Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 637 (1985). We thank Greg Shaffer
for discussions of this point.
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capacity to foster political decisionmaking among lower courts at the
expense of more politically accountable agencies. And our proposal
addresses that very risk by limiting the MQE's application to the Court
alone.
D. Obedience
A fourth objection to our proposal might appeal to concerns
about the Court's ability to control the actions of the lower courts;
namely, a critic might worry that by instructing lower courts not to
apply the MQE, we are opening the door to problematic forms of
disobedience that flout a basic principle of constitutional structure.
What makes a "supreme" court different from an "inferior" court is that
the former gets to tell the latter what to do; any arrangement o the
contrary would fly in the face of a basic structural principle that Article
III creates. Our proposal might appear to invite the lower courts to defy
the Supreme Court by declining to apply an exception that the Court
itself applies. That sort of disobedience, the argument goes, runs
counter to the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary and thus
must be altogether shunned.179
One can raise interesting questions regarding the extent to
which lower courts can and must adhere to the Supreme Court's
commands.180 But our response to the objection is different and more
straightforward: simply put, we do not think our proposal requires the
lower courts to contravene anything the Supreme Court has said. The
Court has only applied the MQE for itself, and it has not ever required
lower courts to do the same. One might characterize our proposal as
requiring lower courts to ignore the MQE, but one alternatively might
characterize the proposal as requiring lower courts to specify that the
MQE encompasses only those questions that the Court itself has
decided to resolve. And we would certainly agree that if in fact the Court
made clear that lower courts must apply the MQE, then those lower
courts would become duty-bound to implement this agenda, however
unwise it might be.
We acknowledge that this response is unlikely to satisfy those
who view the matter as already settled, and so we hasten to add that
we have no qualms with other institutions acting to give lower courts
179. See Caminker, supra note 107, at 828-39 (canvassing formalist justifications for
hierarchical precedent).
180. For a recent entry in the debate, see Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent
from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 925 (2016) (suggesting that, while lower courts cannot defy
Supreme Court precedent, they can 'legitimately narrow [it] by adopting a reasonable reading of
it").
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the green light. We would, for instance, welcome an endorsement of our
proposal from the Court itself: the Justices could explicitly permit or
even require lower courts to eschew the MQE across the board. We
would also welcome congressional intervention along similar lines,
however unlikely that intervention might be. Congress might, for
instance, specify within individual enabling statutes that lower
courts-but not the Supreme Court-must defer to reasonable agency
constructions of any "major" questions raised by those statutes, or it
might amend the APA to universalize the proposal as a statutory
default rule. 181 Or Congress might go even further, creating "fast-track"
procedures through which lower courts could certify "major-seeming"
questions for immediate consideration by the Supreme Court.182 To be
clear, we do not think any of these actions are necessary to legitimize
the lower courts' implementation of our proposal; King, we think,
already gives them all the wiggle room they need. But to the extent that
others disagree, we think there remain various ways by which Congress
and/or the Court could eliminate any obedience-related concerns
altogether.
E. Constitutional Questions as Major Questions?
A further objection might contend that our argument proves too
much. Aren't we arguing that lower courts should stop deciding
important public law questions, such that they should leave the
resolution of constitutional questions, for example, to the Supreme
Court? After all, constitutional questions involve review of government
action, and perhaps our argument means that lower courts should defer
to political actors about the scope of constitutional rights, leaving more
aggressive review for the Supreme Court to apply in appropriate cases.
To the contrary, our arguments for Supreme Court exclusivity
apply to the MQE alone. The MQE is unique. And what makes the MQE
unique is not the majorness of the cases it affects, but rather the
181. Cf. Barnett, supra note 119, at 4 (citing existing statutory provisions that prescribe
deference standards for the courts to apply).
182. Such a fast-track procedure would raise an Article III question about the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction in federal question cases. A fast-track procedure that required the
lower court first to pass upon the major question would seem to give rise to an "appeal" and thus
to comport with Article III's distinction between the Court's original jurisdiction and its appellate
jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction. . . ."). A harder question would arise if Congress directed
the lower courts to certify major questions without considering those questions for themselves, but
we think there is a strong argument that the Court would exercise "appellate" jurisdiction in this
scenario as well, on the theory that the case itself would reside within the lower court's jurisdiction
and only the question would be certified up to the Court.
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institutional incapacity of lower courts to deliver on the benefits that
the MQE itself might yield. Most rules of public law apply far beyond a
small and extraordinary set of inherently certworthy cases and would,
without active lower court enforcement, lose much of their real-world
force if left to the Supreme Court alone. (Imagine, for instance, the
privacy-weakening effects of a regime in which only the Supreme Court
could hear Fourth Amendment claims.) Of equal importance, lower
courts are no less able than the Supreme Court to promote and
vindicate constitutional rights. Lower courts, for instance, can and do
promote privacy interests by invalidating unlawful searches; they can
and do promote values of fairness and equality when they strike down
discriminatory laws; they can and do promote free expression when
they strike down restrictions on political speech; they can and do
promote values of fairness and due process when they invalidate
unlawful convictions; and so forth. But, as we have tried to argue, lower
courts would not be able to promote the intent-, delegation-,
accountability-, and settlement-related values that the MQE exists to
further.
To put the point another way, our argument for Supreme Court
exclusivity in no way relies on the claim that lower courts are less
capable than the Supreme Court at confronting and resolving legal
questions of an apparently major nature. Lots of cases implicate
questions that might qualify as major in some sense, and most of those
cases remain perfectly amenable to lower court resolution. Rather, our
argument relies on the far more limited proposition that the
justifications for withholding Chevron deference on majorness-related
grounds are much more persuasive when the relevant judicial actor is
the Supreme Court itself. When a statutory question is major, the
Supreme Court can point to certain institutional features that it alone
has-e.g., the ability to prescribe geographically uniform law, the
ability to raise the salience of regulatory cases, the ability to speak for
a national constituency, etc.-as rendering it better situated than an
agency to further the values that we think best justify the MQE. Lower
courts cannot point to similar features, and thus they have weaker
grounds for ignoring Chevron's general command. The relevant
question, in other words, is not whether lower courts are capable of
answering major questions (which they undoubtedly are), but rather
whether lower courts can persuasively invoke majorness as a reason to
depart from Chevron (which, we think, they ultimately cannot). That
being so, we do not believe that our position implies anything about
lower courts' powers and responsibilities outside of Chevron's domain.
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F. Unchecked Presidential Power
A final objection to our proposal would assume a more pragmatic
point of view. Whatever the conceptual merits of our argument, this
objection would posit that the MQE represents a valuable tool for lower
courts to use in checking abusive exercises of executive power. Such
abuses seem especially likely to occur with a presidential
administration whose leader has proposed authoritarian policies that
are antithetical to basic norms of American government and who, as
one scholar has recently suggested, may not "care [ ] about separation of
powers at all." 183 With such a president in office, agencies might be more
inclined to leverage "permissible" interpretations of "ambiguous"
statutes to pursue harmful, illiberal, or otherwise undesirable activities
that we would want the courts to strike down. By confining the MQE to
the Supreme Court, our proposal removes one tool for the lower courts
to use in checking executive power. If forced to apply Chevron, those
courts might be made to uphold executive actions that they would want
(and have good reason) to invalidate.
Real as the prospect of abusive actions from the Trump
administration may be, our proposal concerning the MQE would leave
lower courts with a variety of more effective tools with which to address
illiberal and authoritarian executive action. For example, to the extent
that the relevant concern is about arbitrary policymaking, particularly
in a deregulatory direction, we think that "hard look" review under
Section 706 of the APA provides a more comfortable avenue for judicial
intervention.1 84 To the extent that the concern is about procedural
fairness, we think that the procedural requirements of the Due Process
Clause and the APA (as well as other administrative statutes) will offer
a more direct means of redress. To the extent that the concern is about
agencies trampling on civil liberties, we suspect that individual
constitutional rights and/or structural constitutional principles would
offer a readily available check. And that is to say nothing of the variety
of ways in which lower courts might leverage Chevron's two steps in the
service of pushing back against aggressive executive overreach
(including, for example, by appealing to "elephants-in-mouseholes"-like
reasoning at Step One or considering majorness as a factor at Step
Two). We suppose it is possible for a case to arise in which a genuinely
183. Liptak, supra note 15 (quoting Richard Epstein).
184. As Lisa Heinzerling has discussed, application of the MQE tends to favor deregulation
by "requir[ing] clear congressional anguage to enable an ambitious regulatory agenda, but not to
disable one." Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)




Step Zero invocation of the MQE furnishes the only viable means of
checking abusive agency action (and in which the Supreme Court itself
would be unlikely to grant certiorari and apply the MQE for itself), but
we have a hard time imagining just what such a case would look like.
But there is another version of the objection that requires
further thought. Abusive agency action may be significant in the
Chevron context not because it creates a special need for lower courts
to apply the MQE, but rather because it reveals or reflects a new
political reality that undermines the justifications for Chevron itself. If
agencies are abusing their authority willy-nilly, substituting brute-
force and nonsensical assertions of power for the good-faith exercise of
policymaking expertise, then the case for deferring to those agencies'
constructions of ambiguous statutes becomes considerably more
difficult to sustain. Chevron, one might claim, presupposes the
existence of healthy administrative institutions that are functioning
normally against the backdrop of constructive legislative oversight. But
where those presuppositions no longer hold, then Chevron starts to look
more dubious.
One possibility-which we do not rule out-is that the
breakdown in basic norms of good governance could become so complete
as to make it difficult to justify the application of Chevron across the
board. And if that happens, then it would no longer make sense to
maintain, as our proposal does, that the Supreme Court and only the
Supreme Court should apply the MQE. But at that point the wrongness
of our proposal would be attributable to the wrongness of Chevron itself:
we would advocate against lower court deference to an agency in major
cases for the same reasons that we would advocate against any court's
deference to any agency in any case-no matter how "major" or "minor"
seeming the statutory question might be. Indeed, once we have reached
that dismal state of affairs, then the MQE will be the least of our
concerns: nothing less than a wholesale rethinking of administrative
law might well be in order. 185
Outside of that scenario, however, there remains the possibility
of screening for and responding to dysfunction on a more incremental,
case-by-case basis. Chevron itself might constitute the general rule, but
courts might treat case-specific indicators of executive-branch or
congressional dysfunction as a reason to withhold Chevron deference
185. Of course, there is no reason to assume that federal courts will be immune to the same
political forces that might lead us to rethink all of administrative law. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1757 (2013) ("Judges are
inside the political system, not outside it."). Therefore, it is far from clear that the "solution" to a
wholesale failure of federal public administration would be found in constitutional or
administrative law.
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from a particular statutory question. But at this point we have exited
the domain of the MQE as King conceived it and entered the domain of
a new and somewhat different exception to Chevron, one under which
signs of major political dysfunction, rather than substantive indicators
of majorness, operate as the relevant Step Zero trigger. What such an
exception would look like, and how it might operate on the ground, are
questions that we consider in the next Part.
IV. MAJOR DYSFUNCTION AND CHEVRON DEFERENCE
We have argued that lower courts should not withhold deference
from agencies based solely upon their felt sense of the "majorness" of
the statutory question presented by a case. Our argument has depended
upon the view that lower courts are not in a good position to vindicate
any of the MQE's stated or apparent animating values and that, in
attempting to do so, lower courts will inflict unnecessary costs on a
variety of different actors, including themselves.
In this last Part, however, we want to consider a somewhat
different basis for withholding deference from agencies-one that
focuses not on the "majorness" of statutory questions of "deep economic
and political significance," but rather on concerns about major political
dysfunction and institutional breakdowns within the scheme of
separated powers. There are hints of this "major dysfunctions" idea in
King and in prior major questions cases, and we here consider the
possibility of making that idea more pronounced. Our preliminary
thought is that the development of an explicit "major dysfunctions"
exception to Chevron could serve useful purposes, especially in the sort
of polarized and hyperpartisan conditions that afflict our modern-day
political climate. If, however, an exception were to be developed along
these lines, it would carry a different, and more complicated set of
implications regarding the lower courts' role in the exception's
implementation.
In Part IV.A we formalize this idea, exploring whether
dysfunction in the political branches might create circumstances in
which-contrary to the standard Chevron calculus-courts become
institutionally better suited than agencies to resolve a statutory
question. Accepting this idea would not mean jettisoning Chevron
deference entirely, but it would permit the case-by-case withholding of
such deference on dysfunction-related grounds alone. Part IV.B then
explains how partisanship and polarization can heighten the risk of
political dysfunction, both in times of divided government and in times
of unified government, and offers a few reasons why these
vulnerabilities are likely to remain particularly acute in the years to
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come. Finally, Part IV.C sketches some preliminary thoughts on how a
"major dysfunctions" exception to Chevron might be implemented
across the federal judicial hierarchy.
A. A "Major Dysfunctions" Exception?
In Chevron, the Court offered a picture of well-functioning
political branches doing what we hope them to do, namely, resolving
''competing views of the public interest" through legislation,
congressional oversight, and executive rulemaking.186 As the Court
described it, the political branch dynamics revealed an iterative process
between Congress and the Executive Branch regarding the regulation
of air pollutants in response to changing political preferences and
scientific judgments.1 8 1 In the Court's view, the EPA's rule
"represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests," which "Congress intended to accommodate . . . but did not do
so itself on the level of specificity presented" by the statutory
question.188 Against that backdrop, the Court concluded that federal
courts "have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices" by the
executive, reminding them that "[o]ur Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches."189
186. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 848, 866 (1984).
187. The Chevron Court sketched the political branch dynamics as follows. In the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970, Congress tasked the EPA with promulgating National Ambient Air
Quality Standards and mandated, among other things, that "new stationary sources" would be
subject to performance standards. Id. at 846-47. When implementing these standards, the EPA
adopted a plantwide definition of the term "stationary source." By 1975, it was clear that the
regulatory scheme was not working quite as planned: many areas of the country had not come into
compliance with the statute's pollution reduction goals. Id. The 94th Congress was unable,
however, "to agree on what response was in the public interest," as both chambers passed bills
only for the Conference Report to be rejected in the Senate. Id. "In light of this situation," as the
Court put it, the EPA published an interpretive rule "to 'fill the gap' . . . until Congress acted." Id.
at 847-48. Congress acted the next year with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, which the
Court read as a legislative attempt "to accommodate the conflict between" economic and
environmental interests. Id. at 851. Following these amendments, the EPA proposed a rule that
would have adopted a "flexible rather than rigid definition" of the statutory term "source" allowing
the use of the bubble concept for some purposes. Id. at 856. But the EPA changed course in 1980
by adopting a "bright-line rule" limiting the use of the bubble concept based upon two court of
appeals decisions. Id. at 857. In 1981, the Reagan administration directed the EPA to reevaluate
its rule and the agency thereafter adopted the bubble concept, precipitating the Chevron case. Id.
at 857-59.
188. Id. at 865.
189. Id. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). Of course, one
can quarrel with the Court's picture of the legislative- and executive-branch dynamics that led up
to Chevron. We do not enter that debate, but we do insist that the picture of legislative and
executive action that Chevron posited differs from the political picture today, including in the area
of environmental law. Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law at the Crossroads: Looking Back
25, Looking Forward 25, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 267, 268, 272 (2013) (arguing that
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Contrast that view of the political process with the one offered
some thirty years later in King. In a remarkably realist passage, the
Court drew attention to the messy and haphazard process of the ACA's
enactment. As the Court explained, "[T]he Act does not reflect the type
of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant
legislation."190 In particular, the Court explained:
The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting. (To cite
just one, the Act creates three separate Section 1563s.) Several features of the Act's
passage contributed to that unfortunate reality. Congress wrote key parts of the Act
behind closed doors, rather than through "the traditional legislative process." And
Congress passed much of the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as
"reconciliation," which limited opportunities for debate and amendment, and bypassed
the Senate's normal 60-vote filibuster requirement.19 1
The IRS, the Court reasoned, was not well-equipped to make sense of
this statutory mess. To the contrary, it was the Court's duty to do its
"best" to make sense of a "legislative plan"-a plan whose clumsy and
unorthodox enactment deprived it of the requisite level of clarity and
carefulness that the Court would have preferred to see.192
One can understand this passage from King as picking up on a
thread laid down in the Court's previous major question cases.193 In
Brown & Williamson, for instance, there was reason to worry "that the
administration ha[d] acted without regard to its continuous
"[t]wenty-five years ago, the nation could legitimately boast of a Congress fully engaged in
environmental lawmaking," with "[b]oth Democrats and Republicans work[ing] together to enact
sweeping, ambitious federal environmental laws," and that "the last two-plus decades [of
environmental lawmaking] can be fairly dubbed congressional 'descent' ").
190. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 2495-96.
193. Prior to King, Abigail Moncrieff developed a realist account of the major questions
doctrine that focuses upon "noninterference" with legislative deliberations. Moncrieff, supra note
5, at 593. In some cases, she argued, the major questions doctrine prevents the executive from
interfering with Congress's Article I lawmaking function by "restor[ing] a substantive regulatory
status quo ante, allowing congressional negotiations to pick up where they had left off." Id. at 596.
Moncrieff's account makes sense of some of the leading major questions cases, but we note that it
rests upon the normative assumption that simultaneous and overlapping lawmaking in the
executive and legislative branches is a bug, not a feature, of the separation of powers. See Benjamin
Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm,
121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011). Our account, while not inconsistent with Moncrieffs, makes sense of
King, which did not involve executive "interference" in the way Moncrieff describes.
Our account is also consistent with and builds upon Lisa Schultz Bressman's important
discussion of Brown & Williamson and Gonzales v. Oregon, which links the major questions
reasoning of those cases with a requirement that agencies exercise their lawmaking authority "in
a democratically reasonable fashion." Bressman, supra note 5, at 765. As she explains, the Court
had "concrete" evidence in those cases that the executive branch, though formally politically
accountable, had "acted essentially by fiat." Id. at 766. King suggests that this set of concerns
might well extend beyond the specter of administration-by-fiat, though it certainly encompasses
that type of dysfunction.
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commitment of accountable government."1 94  Similarly, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, there was reason to worry that the agency had
deliberately chosen not to utilize its own expertise when faced with a
problem that demanded it.195 When read alongside King, the cases
reflect a vision of policymaking that is far less rosy than the cooperative
model that the Court in Chevron described. 196 In all of these cases, then,
the Court's "major questions" calculus may have depended as much on
the Court's worries about the health of the political process as it did on
the Court's estimation of the stakes of a given case.
It is not difficult to see how one might pick up on this strand
from the Court's "major questions" case law and spin out of it a
194. Bressman, supra note 5, at 782. In that case, the question was one of regulating and
potentially banning tobacco products entirely; though there was increasing anti-tobacco sentiment
among the public in the 1990s, the Clinton administration's tobacco rulemaking and subsequent
litigation against tobacco manufacturers sparked a "factional" political dispute "[d]riven by
powerful political and social pressures." Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and
Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 449 (2000). There are two ways to argue there
was an accountability problem in Brown & Williamson. On one account, the FDA's tobacco
regulation was the result of an aggressive agency interpretation of the FDCA to implement the
priorities of the Clinton White House. Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2282 (2001). In this account, the President drove the agency to repudiate its long-
standing statutory interpretation, one that Congress had relied upon in enacting six different
tobacco-related statutes. Another account suggests that the agency, and particularly the FDA's
head, solicited the President's support as political cover because the agency knew its action would
be unpopular. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 66-75
(2000). In fact, there was widespread opposition to the FDA's proposed rule from both Democrats
and Republicans, as the agency predicted. See id. Thus understood, the FDA's assertion of
authority was self-consciously anti-democratic, or at least could have appeared so to the Court.
195. In that case, there was evidence, which the Court apparently was aware of, that the
George W. Bush White House had directed the EPA to change its views on greenhouse gas
regulation. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 51, at 64. In justifying its decision not to regulate
greenhouse gases, the EPA cited the President's climate change policy and offered a dubious
scientific argument to support this policy of non-regulation. See id. at 64-65. Most importantly for
our purposes, the administration invoked Brown & Williamson's major questions concept to argue
that Congress had not authorized it to regulate greenhouse gases. Taking that argument head-on,
and rejecting it entirely, the Court effectively held that the question of climate change was too
important for the agency to answer it based upon the president's priorities rather than its
expertise. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530 (2007). Thus, the Court's holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA, which required the agency to consider regulating greenhouse gases, was
"expertise-forcing." Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 51, at 64.
196. King did not highlight any political dysfunction in the executive branch, but it hinted at
concerns about the IRS's expertise. It's worth noting that the IRS's rulemaking "asserted without
elaboration" its statutory interpretation. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
The Court might have thought, as the D.C. Circuit below intimated, that the IRS did not exercise
its expert judgment when interpreting the statute, but instead implemented President Obama's
priorities regarding Obamacare. That is not to agree that the IRS's action suffered from a
democratic deficit; indeed, we think on the merits that the IRS, and therefore the Court, got the
statutory question correct. But it is to say that King's concerns about the IRS's expertise fit into
the pattern of major questions cases.
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dysfunctions-based exception to Chevron itself. The theoretical
underpinnings of the idea are straightforward. Where political
dysfunction manifests itself, Chevron's justifications become
considerably weaker, and courts thus have a stronger basis for
replacing Chevron with either weaker deference or outright de novo
review. First is the problem of agency expertise: Chevron points to
agencies' specialized knowledge and experience in the regulatory area
as a reason for judicial deference.197 Where partisanship and
politicization seep into agency deliberations, we might question the
extent to which a given interpretation reflects an informed and
considered judgment on the part of an expert agency. Such a concern
weighed on the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, in which
the Court, in the course of rejecting an agency interpretation of the
Clean Air Act, faulted the agency for relying too heavily on nonscientific
justifications.198
Political dysfunction might undercut Chevron's accountability-
based justification as well. Appointment and removal by the President,
and oversight by both the President and Congress, together endow
agencies with a degree of democratic legitimacy that their judicial
counterparts do not enjoy, and Chevron respects that legitimacy by
giving agencies rather than courts the final say on contested matters of
statutory interpretation. 199 But when agencies self-consciously attempt
to preempt or undermine congressional initiatives, or when agencies
take positions that depart substantially from popular preferences, it
might be more difficult to accord democratic legitimacy to their present-
day actions and even harder to imagine the agency responding
constructively to an adverse public reaction.200
B. Political Dysfunction in a Polarized Time
All of which bears special relevance to the politics of today.
Although "[s]ome things have not changed much" since Chevron was
decided in 1984,201 the country today is a more polarized place. Ours is
an "an era riven by partisanship,"20 2 marked by hardened party
197. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
198. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533.
199. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (pointing to the President's electoral accountability).
200. Bressman, supra note 5, at 782-83 ("One inference when the administration ignores
congressional or popular preferences i that it is serving the interests of favored constituencies.").
201. Farina & Metzger, supra note 19, at 1684.
202. Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 1379, 1394-95 (2012).
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loyalties and intensified political disagreements.203 Polarization has
frustrated the ability of Democrats and Republicans to create "cross
cutting" coalitions, which in turn has made "political compromise ...
quite difficult" to achieve.204 These factors have contributed to increased
levels of paralysis and brinkmanship within Congress,205 and they raise
the likelihood of future legislative difficulties and future political
dysfunction in the years to come.
The nub of the concern is presidential power. In a hyperpolarized
time, as Professor Thomas McGarity argues, "high-stakes rulemaking"
can become a "blood sport," in which powerful political pressures come
to bear on agency decisionmaking.206 Chief among these pressures may
be those coming from the White House, which is uniquely well-suited to
command agency action during times of intense partisanship. And
where this is so, courts might have especially good reasons to be
concerned about presidential dominance of lawmaking to the exclusion
of agency expertise, congressional intent, or even the preferences of the
median voter. Perhaps under such circumstances, courts turn out to
enjoy the comparative institutional advantage in shoring up the
separation of powers by deciding statutory questions without deferring
to the agency's views.
With its discussion of congressional dysfunction, King hinted at
partisan political forces that weaken congressional oversight of
agencies. Congress, of course, has always been at an inherent
disadvantage vis-A-vis the President when it comes to overseeing
agencies because it is "[d]ivided into two chambers with very different
representational bases, and saddled by the Constitution and
longstanding practice with various supermajoritarian hurdles to
action . . . ."207 But partisanship, particularly under conditions of
hyperpolarization and divided government, compounds the
disadvantage, further weakening congressional controls on agency
203. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011). This process, as Sunstein has
suggested, has been both caused and affected by increases in both implicit and explicit forms of
partisan bias. See Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2016). For example,
nearly half (49%) of Republicans would be "displeased" if their child married a Democrat, and a
third (33%) of Democrats would feel the same about their child's cross-partisan marriage. See id.
at 4.
204. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System Is
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1169-70 (2014).
205. See id. at 1175-76.
206. McGarity, supra note 19, at 1758.
207. Farina & Metzger, supra note 19, at 1685-86.
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discretion while strengthening the loyalty of agencies' political
appointees to their principals in the White House. 208
When Congress is gridlocked, pressure increases on the
President to direct administrative lawmaking in order to solve
mounting social problems. As the "single public official at the head of
the national executive branch," the President has many tools available
to her to make policy, including directing the federal bureaucracy.209
Presidential administration may be an efficient and politically
accountable way to coordinate administrative lawmaking.210 But a
White House that seizes the reins might push administrative
lawmaking in ways that undermine agency expertise or direct agencies
to adopt policies that do not comport with the preferences of the
enacting (or the current) Congress. And a divided Congress may be
unable to check such administrative actions.
Moreover, the congressional oversight that does occur in a
hyperpolarized environment is not likely to foster congressional and
executive collaboration to solve social problems. Recall again the
collaborative process between Congress and the EPA that Chevron
posited. In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress amended environmental
statutes, like the Clean Air Act, to update them in response to problems
observed by the EPA and others.211 During that time, the EPA would
periodically and self-consciously fill regulatory "gaps" until Congress
could act.2 1 2 Contrast hat process with the hyperpolarized debate about
the ACA's implementation. There is perhaps no better example than
the House of Representative's lawsuit to stymie the Obama
administration's implementation of the Act, with the Republican-
controlled House arguing that the administration had unlawfully
diverted appropriations to insurance companies.213 Maybe this
congressional opposition is unsurprising; no Republican in either the
House or Senate voted for the ACA, and King v. Burwell itself reflected
a not-so-veiled partisan "effort to pull the [ACA] apart by concentrating
on 'bits and pieces of the law.' "214 As Professor Gillian Metzger has
summarized it, "resistance [to the Act] has an overwhelmingly partisan
cast, with the ACA closely identified with President Obama and the
208. Metzger, supra note 19, at 1748-57.
209. Seth Davis, Presidential Government and the Law of Property, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 471,
475, 487-93 (discussing presidential tools of policymaking, including unilateral action,
presidential administration, and presidential leadership).
210. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 194, at 2339.
211. Freeman & Spence, supra note 19, at 8-9.
212. See supra note 187.
213. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015).
214. Gluck, supra note 19, at 63-64.
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Democratic Party, and opposition to 'Obamacare' being a central
Republican rallying cry." 215
Of course, the federal government in 2017 is no longer divided,
and the associated risks of legislative paralysis, brinkmanship, and
interbranch warfare have accordingly subsided. But unified
government presents its own set of risks, ones that seem especially
acute in light of the authoritarian affinities of the new leader of the
executive branch. Donald Trump has "provok[ed] unusual alarm in
some quarters about how the imperial power of the presidency might be
put to use,"2 1 6 by promising, among other things, to deport "probably 2
million," or perhaps many more, undocumented immigrants
immediately after taking office,217 to order a "total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,"2 18 and to impose
"retribution" upon "any business that leaves our country for another
country."219 Under the political conditions of Chevron's time, such
initiatives would likely have encountered significant resistance from
Congress, and the constitutional scheme of separated powers might
have sufficed to circumscribe any attempts to pursue such an agenda
through unilateral executive action. But today's conditions of
partisanship and polarization significantly reduce the possibility of
meaningful oversight and/or resistance by the President's co-partisans
in the legislative branch.220 This prospect of weak legislative oversight,
combined with the President's increased power over the bureaucracy,
would likely enable the incoming President to leverage the
administrative apparatus on behalf of a variety of rash and
215. Metzger, supra note 19, at 1774.
216. Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 41
n.48 (2016). As another scholar has put it, it is not clear whether Donald Trump "cares about he
separation of powers at all." See Liptak, supra note 15 (quoting Professor Richard Epstein).
217. Bill Chappell, Donald Trump Says He'll Deport 2-3 Million People Once In Office, NPR
(Nov. 13, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/13/501921177/donald-trump-
says-hell-deport-2-3-million-people-once-in-office [https://perma.cc/TSE4-PCEU].
218. Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR
PRESIDENT (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-
statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration [https://perma.cc/7M2G-QGLJ].
219. Nelson D. Schwartz, Vowing to Squeeze Businesses, Trump Has Tactics Challenged, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/us/politics/trump-takes-twitter-aim-at-
companies-looking-to-move-jobs-abroad.html [https://perma.cclM6HM-ZJHX].
220. Of course, it is always true that Congress will be less likely to provide meaningful
oversight during a period of unified government than under a period of divided government. See
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311,
2329 (2006) ("[W]hen government is unified and the engine of party competition is removed from
the internal structure of government, we should expect interbranch competition to dissipate.").
Our observation here is that the polarization exacerbates the problem, by reducing the ideological
independence of the President's co-partisans and increasing the costs of intramural disagreement
andlor perceived disloyalty to the party itself.
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unconsidered policy proposals-proposals that, in one way or another,
might fail to reflect the sort of deliberation, agency expertise, and
congressional oversight that Chevron itself seemed to take for granted.
Time will tell the full extent of what the new administration will
bring (and what future eras of unified or divided government may
bring), and-as we have already suggested-if the problem of
dysfunction becomes sufficiently widespread, then it may well become
necessary to rethink the wisdom of the Chevron project in its entirety
(to say nothing of many other foundations of modern administrative
law). If, by contrast, the problems turn out to be real but sporadic-with
some regulations reflecting the "standard operating procedures" of
administrative law and others reflecting major dysfunction-then a
dysfunctions-based exception to Chevron might prove to be a useful and
desirable judicial tool.
C. Minor Courts, Major Dysfunctions?
Even if we accept the idea of a "major dysfunctions" exception to
Chevron, the question arises whether in times of political dysfunction,
courts would enjoy any comparative advantage over agencies when it
comes to screening for dysfunction and deciding the legal issues around
which the dysfunction has occurred. Courts, after all, are subject to
their own forms of dysfunction, and their own statutory decisions might
sometimes reflect bare-knuckled partisan combat rather than the good-
faith application of law to fact. Equally problematic, aggressive
implementation of a "major dysfunctions" rule might have distorting
effects on Congress. As Professors Daniel Rodriguez and Barry
Weingast have pointed out, judicial "efforts at 'improving' the political
process may have the reverse effect of facilitating polarization."2 2 1 For
instance, aggressive judicial review can "reinforce extremism within the
contemporary Congress,"222 exacerbating rather than ameliorating
partisan tensions. "Dysfunction" itself, moreover, is an open-ended and
manipulable concept, and courts might well use the idea as their own
sort of partisan weapon against administrative regulation.
The Supreme Court in particular is a political body, and the
Justices' decisions about statutory questions are hardly immune from
partisan politics. In King, for example, perhaps the Chief Justice was
playing the political long game, rejecting a conservative challenge to the
ACA tax credits but expanding judicial power to check progressive
221. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory




policymaking in the executive branch. And indeed, the King Court's
political long game may have something to do with conservative
Justices' suspicion of administrative regulation. Professor Lisa
Heinzerling has argued that King's MQE is one of several "power
canons" that "make Congress uncertain of the words it must use to set
in motion an active regulatory program."223 While King itself did not
disable the ACA, some of the prior major questions cases, such as Brown
& Williamson, prevented an agency from addressing major social and
economic problems, seemingly on the premise that "inaction was the
proper course," unless and until Congress clearly authorized
administrative regulation.224
All of that being said, there are several ways in which the Court
might attempt to explain its implicit comparative analysis of judicial
and agency competencies when it comes to shielding administrative law
from dysfunctional politics. The Court has unique expertise in declaring
the law in cases of national economic and political significance. It has
the benefit of high-quality briefing from the parties in most cases and
can rely upon amici to flesh out the practical and political stakes of a
case.2 2 5 With its small docket, the Court also has the benefit of time.2 2 6
And, we might think, the Justices have the benefit of the experience
that comes with the Court's law declaration function. In some cases,
therefore, the Court's competence may meet or exceed that of an
agency's. And in those cases where the Court suspects either (a) that
legislative dysfunction has obscured the meaning and significance of a
legislative "plan"; or (b) that the agency's interpretation of that plan
reflects an all-out capitulation to politics rather than a genuine exercise
of expertise, it may rightly exercise independent judgment to answer
the statutory question for itself.
In addition to comparative expertise, the Court might also argue
that, when accountability-related "danger signals"2 2 7 indicate a
breakdown of oversight or a hyperpoliticization of agency action, its
democratic pedigree compares favorably with the agency's. The
Supreme Court can claim, for instance, "to have been democratically
authorized to make national policy." 2 2 8 The nomination and
appointment of Supreme Court Justices is visible on a national stage.
We understand that the Justices will declare the law in cases of deep
223. Heinzerling, supra note 184 (manuscript at 51).
224. Id. (manuscript at 39).
225. See Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference, supra note 12, at 740-41.
226. See id. at 740.
227. Bressman, supra note 5, at 782.
228. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference, supra note 12, at 747.
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national significance, and that's why they are vetted for "their views of
wise policy." 2 29 That does not mean the Court is more responsive to
majoritarian preferences than an agency, though some scholars have
argued the Court never strays too far from public opinion.230 But it
would at least mean that when the other branches find themselves
roiled in political turmoil, the Court can claim some sort of popular
mandate to come in and attempt to clean up the mess.
Finally, and related to the previous point, the Court might claim
a distinctive institutional ability to terminate an otherwise unhealthy
political dispute. As we have already noted, one administration's
resolution of statutory ambiguity does not foreclose the possibility of a
future administration's reversal. The prospect of such a reversal might
figure prominently in presidential politics, with candidates vowing
either to undo or maintain the contested agency action as part of their
respective campaign platforms. That possibility may not be troubling in
and of itself, but it might become troubling where the underlying issue
is one that implicates or exacerbates dysfunctional oversight in
Congress or future dysfunctional decisionmaking within the agency.
And under those circumstances, the Court's ability to close off the
debate might well look like a comparative institutional virtue.
Supposing, then, that the Court has the institutional features
necessary to effectuate a dysfunction-based exception to Chevron, we
must next ask-in the spirit of the foregoing discussion-whether lower
courts possess the same institutional features as well. Here, we think
the calculus is considerably more complex than the one we considered
in connection with the MQE. To begin with, and in contrast to the MQE,
lower court enforcement of a dysfunction-based exception to Chevron
does have the potential to further that exception's goals-namely, that
of reducing or deterring dysfunction within the political branches. After
all, the greater the number of courts that withheld deference from
agencies on dysfunction-related grounds, the greater the incentive that
agencies would have to adhere to norms and conventions of good
governance-however those norms might be defined. Thus, in contrast
to the MQE, a major dysfunctions-based rationale would, we think,
implicate values and objectives that the lower courts were
institutionally well situated to promote.
On the other hand, we might nonetheless worry about the lower
courts' ability to screen for and police against dysfunction in a reliable,
transparent, and definitive manner. Political dysfunction is not a self-
229. Id. at 746.
230. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
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defining concept, and lower courts may lack the expertise, political
involvement, and nationwide mandate that may be necessary to flesh
out its meaning. For example, with regard to institutional expertise
needed to screen for dysfunctional politics and to displace
"dysfunctional" agency interpretations with de novo interpretations of
statutes, the Court's experience and expertise might not extend to the
lower courts, where "[t]ime is short," "[t]he quality and effort of the
advocates is uneven," and "[a]micus briefs . . . are quite rare."2 31 So too
for democratic pedigree. Lower court appointments are less visible than
Supreme Court appointments. They often reflect state-level concerns,
such as when Senators press for nominations to satisfy their
constituents. The differences between district court appointments and
Supreme Court appointments is particularly stark. And precisely
because "Supreme Court Justices have a stronger claim, as compared
to lower-court judges, to have been democratically authorized to make
national policy," 2 32 we might be nervous about extending lower court
judges too much leeway to make broad, nationally salient
pronouncements about the presence or absence of dysfunction within
national politics.
Further complicating matters, not all lower courts may be alike
for purposes of implementing a "major dysfunctions" exception to the
Chevron test. Consider, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. Even if we were generally hesitant about giving lower courts a
role to play in policing for breakdowns in agency governance, we might
nonetheless feel comfortable about according the D.C. Circuit an
elevated role. The argument would go like this: by virtue of the D.C.
Circuit's docket, which is stuffed with administrative law cases, the
D.C. Circuit's judges develop a keen sense for distinguishing between
typical and dysfunctional administrative lawmaking. And, by virtue of
its docket, the D.C. Circuit regularly adjudicates appeals of major
administrative actions, giving its judges a particular familiarity with
how agencies can and should address major statutory questions.233 And
by virtue of its location and wide-ranging jurisdiction over
administrative cases, the D.C. Circuit may have a greater claim to
national (as opposed to merely regional) policymaking authority. We
have serious concerns about the difficulties of implementing a
dysfunctions-based exception to Chevron, not the least of which is the
difficulty of distinguishing "dysfunctional" from "run of the mill" politics
in a principled manner. But to the extent that we are comfortable with
231. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference, supra note 12, at 742.
232. Id. at 747.
233. See Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 2-4.
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according such an authority to the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit
might be similarly institutionally situated to exercise a similar form of
authority as well. 2 3 4
Our thoughts on all of these matters are tentative, and much
more work is required to figure out precisely what a "major
dysfunctions" exception to Chevron might look like, whether such an
exception would be desirable, and how such an exception might operate
on the ground. But we do firmly believe that acknowledging the
heterogeneity of the federal judiciary and being open to the possibility
of inter-court variability in the implementation of administrative
review standards will facilitate rather than frustrate careful thinking
about this particular issue, along with many others. And that is, in a
sense, the most important takeaway of the specific proposal that the
bulk of this Article has set forth: whatever one's views of the MQE, and
of our specific proposal concerning its exclusive application by the
Supreme Court, we hope at least to have demonstrated that rigid
uniformity in the application of substantive standards need not be
viewed as an inevitable feature of federal court adjudication. Much to
the contrary, we believe that by acknowledging and responding to the
differing institutional capabilities of the Supreme Court and its
subordinates, we will be better situated to develop workable and
effective rules of administrative law.
CONCLUSION
It would be too much to say that there are no major questions in
minor courts. But we have argued that lower federal courts should
assume precisely that when applying the Chevron framework, treating
the domain of Chevron as unaffected by their independent (and
inevitably political) judgments of a case's importance. The impulses
behind the expansion of the MQE are understandable. But if we are
going to redirect questions of "deep 'economic and political
significance' "235 from agencies to courts, then we think they should be
shifted to the one court that is most like an agency.236
234. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference, supra note 12, at 761 ("To the extent the D.C.
Circuit is a 'junior varsity' Supreme Court in terms of its institutional context and competencies,
reduced deference vis-a-vis other lower courts is defensible." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
235. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
236. See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal,
89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2011) ("[In relying on amici, the Court acts like an agency-but not
quite.'.
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